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The performance of the public sector is strongly 
influenced by the management culture in which it operates. 
The current bureaucratic model of management has worked 
exceedingly well due to timely modifications. However, many 
reformers have come forth with a new approach to management, 
emphasizing teams and customer service, thus challenging the 
traditional model of management. Despite numerous calls to 
"reinvent" government, the mere fact that reformers can find 
entrepreneurship and innovation in government today, 
emphasizes the resilience of classical bureaucracy.
Although slow to reflect changes, public management has 
begun adapting, incrementally, to new times. Thus, this 
research will examine the thesis that while classic public 
management has been modified by reform, it has successfully 
resisted radical reinvention movements that would change the 
foundation of public management.
Using an analytical research design, this thesis will 
describe the evolution of civil service reform and 
investigate the challenges to modern reform movements with a 
special emphasis on the reinventing government movement.
The first chapter introduces the bureaucracy. The second 
chapter will include an historical perspective. Three 
stages of civil service evolution will be discussed 
including: classical, scientific management, and public
choice. These three stages have arisen out of an 
evolutionary process. The third chapter articulates the 
entrepreneurial model concerning privatization of public 
business. The fourth chapter focuses on selected impacts of 
the above entrepreneurial model on public management.
Finally, the last chapter discusses the challenges of 
modern reform attempts of the civil service and how they 
compare with the entrepreneurial model. Thus, this research 
reconstructs public management evolution, evaluates a modern 
reform movement, discusses the current challenges of reform 
movements today, and concludes that classic public 
management resists revolutionary change.
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I. AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: AN INTRODUCTION
The performance of the public sector is strongly 
influenced by the management culture in which it operates.  ̂
The current bureaucratic model of management has worked
9exceedingly well due to timely modifications. However, 
many reformers have come forth with a new approach to 
management, emphasizing teams and customer service, thus 
challenging the traditional model of management. However, 
despite numerous calls to "reinvent" government, the mere 
fact that reformers can find entrepreneurship and innovation 
in government today emphasizes the resilience of classical 
bureaucracy- Although slow to reflect changes, public 
management has begun adapting, incrementally, to new times. 
Thus, this research will examine the thesis that while 
classic public management has been modified by reform, it 
has successfully resisted radical reinvention movements that 
would change the foundation of public management.
Antibureaucratic sentiment has been an integral part of 
the intellectual and political reform movements that have 
shaped American federal, state, and local governments 
throughout the 20th century.^ The civil service reform 
movement includes the ideology, laws, regulations, and 
administrative strategies and inter- and intra- 
organizational checks, balances, and institutions aimed at
1
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defining, identifying, and motivating responsive and 
efficient civil service strategies.^ This process has been 
cumulative. Each new reform increases the quantity and 
intensity of reorganization in bureaucracy and increases the 
reformer's impact on public administration.
Overview
Using an analytical research design, this thesis will
describe the evolution of civil service reform and
investigate the challenges to modern reform movements with a
special emphasis on the reinventing government movement.
Pursuit of the public good has included an image of
«efficient and responsive governmental operations. Despite 
the expansion of the definitions of bureaucratic 
responsiveness, multiplication of efficiency strategies, and 
intensification of control techniques, more intervention 
always seems to be required. Currently, public 
administration is being influenced by a new entrepreneurial 
model which has a distinct agenda and impact on the 
operation of American government. The entrepreneurial 
model, also known as "reinventing government," is 
articulated by David Osborne, a journalist and bureaucratic 
consultant, and Ted Gaebler, a practitioner in public-sector 
management. Osborne and Gaebler have contributed first hand
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to the Clinton administration's public management reform 
movement.
Observations in this research will be drawn from the 
large scholarly literature on civil service reforms. While 
civil service reform in government has received a great deal 
of attention from political scientists and urban 
specialists, the connection between civil service reform and 
public administration has rarely been systematically 
examined. Therefore, this inquiry will address such 
questions as: What forces led to a need for governmental
reform? How do various reforms effect established theories 
of public administration? What implications do reforms hold 
for public services performance? What lessons have been 
learned about what works and what does not? Where should 
reformers go from here?
The first chapter introduces the bureaucracy. The 
second chapter will include an historical perspective.
Three stages of civil service evolution will be discussed 
including: classical, scientific management, and public
choice. These three stages have arisen out of an 
evolutionary process. Thus, the first two chapters are an 
examination of an institution that has been built on 100 
years of ideology, rules, institutions, legal techniques, 
and reformist ideas. The third chapter articulates Osborne 
and Gaebler's entrepreneurial model concerning privatization
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of public business. The fourth chapter focuses on selected 
impacts of the above entrepreneurial model on public 
management.
Finally/ the last chapter discusses the challenges of 
modern reform attempts of the civil service and how they 
compare with the following assertion by Osborne and Gaebler: 
"What is needed now is not a continuation of a 100 year old 
bandage/ but rather an infusion of entrepreneurial spirit." 
(p. 10) These authors maintain that if civil servants are 
allowed to act as entrepreneurs/ government business will 
not only be efficient, but will flourish. Thus, this 
research reconstructs public management evolution, evaluates 
a modern reform movement, discusses the current challenges 
of reform movements today, and concludes that classic public 
management resists revolutionary change.
D,.£.£,ih.ition dnd Scopg of Byreauc.tdC-v
Negative connotations of bureaucracy are hard to 
escape. For example, bureaucracy evokes thoughts of endless 
red tape, inefficiency, and unresponsiveness-̂  To most 
people, the bureaucracy is the faceless entity that forces 
them to fill out tax forms, stand in line at post offices, 
or register for a Selective Service system, even when there 
is no draft. But bureaucrats touch people's lives in many 
other ways as well. OSSA safety inspectors are bureaucrats.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The food we eat, the prescription drugs we take, the cars we 
drive, the sports equipment we play with, even the fire- 
resistant pajamas we slept in as children all fall under 
regulations established by federal bureaucracies.
Bureaucracy, in effect, refers to the millions of full­
time career employees who do the day-to-day work of 
government. Indeed, the bureaucracy's continuous impact on 
policy is immense. Often bureaucrats must interpret vague 
and sometimes contradictory directives from the legislature 
or the political appointees and elected officials of the 
executive branch. Bureaucrats must often decide how to 
allocate resources too scarce to complete assigned tasks. 
Even though on the surface the bureaucracy may appear 
nonpolitical, bureaucrats often make highly controversial 
decisions that spark intense political debate .̂  Thus, as 
the primary means of policy implementation, the bureaucracy 
can help, hinder, or redirect the implementation of policy.
To aid in public management reform discussion, the 
following observations concerning the characteristics of 
bureaucracy are made: Bureaucracies carry out a variety of
tasks, including policymaking, supervision, and
oenforcement.” In doing so, bureaucracies mix executive, 
legislative, and judicial functions. The structure of 
bureaucracies reflects our federal system, with fractured 
and overlapping lines of authority. In addition, there are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
no simple answers, whether they be all-out centralization or 
decentralization of responsibility, in optimizing 
bureaucratic performance. It is also crucial to note that 
bureaucracies in action rarely resemble the ideal envisioned 
by social theorists or described by legislation.^
One of the earliest and most important observers of 
bureaucracy as a distinctive organizational type was German 
sociologist. Max Weber. He identified the essential 
characteristics of bureaucracy, including the assignment of 
clear areas of responsibility within the organization, a 
specific hierarchy, operation according to established 
rules, and careful record keeping. Weber distinguished 
bureaucratic agencies from groups that did not share these 
characteristics. Although we often complain about 
bureaucracy, Weber admired it as a means of getting beyond 
the limitations of human individuals.^®
Many of the criticisms of bureaucracy concern the very 
characteristics that make bureaucracy valuable. Having to 
fill out forms, for example, feeds the institutional memory. 
Imagine how a student would feel, for example, if he/she 
were getting ready to graduate from college and the 
registrar said, "No one around here remembers your taking 
freshman math, so you'll have to take it again." A paper 
trail is a valuable thing. Complaints are also raised about 
the impersonal treatment received at the hands of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bureaucracies (for example, the complaint of, "I'm just a 
number"), however, depersonalization means that in a well- 
run bureaucracy, people get their benefits, regardless of 
party affiliation, religion, or any other personal 
characteristic.
Weber's enthusiasm for bureaucracy did not blind him to 
the dangers of an overly bureaucratic society.^̂  There will 
always be tension between sticking to the rules and making 
allowances. A  tendency to veer too far in either direction 
is dangerous to fairness, effectiveness, and even freedom. 
The dangers, though, are not in bureaucracy itself. It is 
important to measure the distance between the ideal and the
1 'yreal.^^ If the intricacies of the federal system and the 
limitations of political accommodation had been overcome 
with a single, functional bureaucracy, many tensions between 
the two may have been overcome. After all, the outrage when 
"the system" fails to protect is based on the normal 
expectation of bureaucratic success.
People who attack bureaucracies claim that through it,
big government too often harasses individuals and groups,
places too many restrictions on people's actions, and
1 1engages in costly and inefficient practices. In this 
view, bureaucrats have become a power unto themselves, 
dictating from Washington the way people throughout the 
country ought to live their lives. On the other hand.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
defenders of bureaucracy argue that a modern society could
not function without bureaucratic procedures. After all,
they say, someone must send out the social security checks
and make the appropriate rules for eligibility; someone must
police safety and check on air pollution; and so on. In
addition, they maintain that, at times, government
bureaucracy stands as the sole defender of citizens who
would otherwise be powerless against discrimination and
other violations of individual rights and threats to health
and safety. Rather than abolishing bureaucracy, they
conclude, there is a need to establish a better, more
1 «responsive, more efficient bureaucracy.
People also often charge that bureaucracy is too 
unresponsive to political initiatives. Bureaucrats, they 
say, are primarily concerned with keeping their own jobs A 
new president finds it almost impossible to make significant 
changes because the bureaucrats frustrate any drive toward 
innovation or policy change. To understand these charges, 
the history of the civil service must be examined.
A  Brief History of the Federal Bureaucracy
The first federal job appointments were made by George 
Washington, who declared that his choices were based 
entirely on "fitness of character." It soon became 
apparent, however, that most of those found "fit" were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
associated with the emerging Federalist party, which 
Washington and Alexander Hamilton headed. When Thomas 
Jefferson became president in 1801, he set a precedent by 
dismissing hundreds of Federalists from government jobs and
1 ftinstalling his supporters in their places.^
Thereafter, under what became known as the spoils 
system, elected officials routinely rewarded friends and 
supporters with government jobs. The spoils system reached 
its peak under President Andrew Jackson. After his election 
in 1828, Jackson dismissed more than one-third of the six 
hundred upper-level officeholders and from 10 to 20 percent 
of the ten thousand government officials who occupied lower-
1 nlevel positions.^
The spoils system made sense because the political 
parties needed some form of patronage to reward party 
workers. During the nineteenth century the government had 
little need for trained specialists, so a high turnover in 
personnel usually did not endanger operating efficiency. 
Furthermore, any president was entitled to fill key 
positions with people who shared his political philosophy.
By the 187 0s obvious abuses of the spoils system had 
provoked a clamor for reform. These demands led to action 
after President James A. Garfield was assassinated by a 
disappointed office seeker in 1881. With the support of 
Garfield's successor, Chestor A. Arthur, Congress passed a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bill establishing the bipartisan Civil Service Commission to 
administer competitive examinations and make appointments to 
office based on merit.
The federal civil service system now places college 
graduates in most bureaus. Very high levels of educational 
specialization also are common in the federal bureaucracy. 
Yet this emphasis on expertise, to the exclusion of 
political factors, has its costs. Most civil servants 
cannot be removed from their jobs except for gross 
misconduct, and many promotions are based on seniority 
rather than on merit. The laudable purpose of these 
procedures— to insulate the bureaucracy from unwarranted 
political interference--also protects bureaucrats from 
demands for high performance.^^
President Jimmy Carter instituted a number of civil 
service reforms designed to enhance the role of merit in 
promotions, salary increases, and terminations. The Carter 
administration reforms had the following goals: to reward
merit more adequately; to keep top civil servants from 
becoming too deeply entrenched in their positions; 
unresponsive to changes in policy; and more generally, to 
produce a British-style senior civil service of capable 
generalists -
One of the best-known aspects of the British 
bureaucracy is the "administrative class," made up of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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approximately 7,500 senior staffers selected through a civil
service system. These top civil servants are closely
71involved in the formulation of public policy. It is their
job to screen important information for the ministers of
each department, to provide political advice, and to comment
on the wisdom and practicality of various policy proposals.
What they do not do is administer the various departments of
the bureaucracy. British civil servants usually view their
jobs as lifetime commitments, not as stepping stones to
positions in industry or politics. Most regard themselves
as the long-term protectors of the public interest and the
upholders of high civil standards. They are sometimes
criticized for being too cautious and unimaginative.
France was one of the first European nations to create
a modern-style bureaucracy, and the existence of a top
administrative class similar to the one in Great Britain has
been a distinguishing feature of French bureaucratic
organization. At the top of the French administrative
hierarchy are several thousand bureaucrats, three hundred to
five hundred of whom are highly active in the political
decision-making process.
What is most striking about top French administrators
is that they have become almost a hereditary group due to
77selective school entrance e x a m s . T h e s e  administrators 
have long considered themselves not mere civil servants but
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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rather managers for society as a whole and agents of change 
in the modernization of France. Many bureaucrats resent 
French political parties when they interfere with 
legislation hatched among the administrative class. When 
the Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand came to 
power in 1981, it implemented proposals to decentralize the 
French bureaucracy. Mitterrand's was the first move toward 
decentralization in a bureaucratic system that had been 
highly centralized for centuries.
Bureaucracies are also embedded firmly in the political 
process. An example is found in the development of airbags. 
In 1971, President Richard Nixon's transportation secretary, 
John Volpe, issued Safety Standard 208, which required the 
installation of air bags or safety belts in all new cars.
The Nixon White House, however, apparently responding to 
pressure from the automobile industry, postponed 
implementation of the standard in 1972. Then, four years 
later. President Gerald Ford's secretary of transportation 
rescinded S.S. 208
In 1977, the Carter administration was more favorably 
inclined toward consumer safety, and the attempt to get an 
air bag ruling began again. However, the Reagan 
administration took office before the ruling was complete 
and S.S. 208 was revoked again. Then, in 1982, litigation 
ruling for the safety device was upheld. Despite this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ruling, it was not until the 1990s that a majority of 
automobile manufacturers were offering the airbag, but 
usually only as an option.
This case raised the obvious question of, "Under what 
circumstances are bureaucrats better representatives of the 
public interest than elected officials subject to direct 
political pressure?" Political considerations can lead to 
short-term planning and the implementation of splashy 
programs that actually serve the public less well in the 
long run. In trying to make government appear to be running 
smoothly, partisan bureaucrats might ignore the reasoned 
judgments of long-range planners.
£̂ ii.Li.c..s..*- Di..s.c..m .t..io,Q.̂ and the Importance of Bureaucracy
A balance must be worked out between the need for 
unfettered administrative expertise and the need for 
responsible and responsive political control. To understand 
the ramifications of this dichotomy, it must be analyzed how 
and to what extent the bureaucracy is involved in the 
political process. Currently, the bureaucratic apparatus 
has evolved into a collection of highly specialized 
subdivisions, sometimes insulated from the public, sometimes 
essentially self-governing, often backed by subdivisions of 
Congress and by powerful interest groups. Bureaucratic 
discretion, expertise, and support systems strengthen the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bureaucracy's political position, while the extensive use of 
contract bureaucrats weakens it to some extent.
The concept of bureaucratic discretion also affects 
public management. When bureaucracies are called on to 
implement legislation--promulgating specific regulations for 
cleaner air, workplace safety, fireproofing clothing, and 
the like— bureaucrats have considerable latitude in applying 
laws to particular cases. This administrative discretion 
forms the basis for bureaucratic political participation.
For example, in 1991 new questions about the safety of 
silicon gel breast implants arose in connection with 
allegations that the manufacturer had suppressed negative 
research findings. The FDA had to decide whether to allow 
the continued use of breast implants while awaiting further 
research results, or to ban them entirely. Government 
bureaucrats make policy by applying the broad powers granted 
to them by Congress and the president.
Several factors involved in legislative decision making 
contribute to bureaucratic discretion. Most fundamentally, 
the legislature could not possibly establish clear rules 
covering all contingencies— an exercise for which it has 
neither the time nor the expertise. In addition, vague 
rules or guidelines often reflect legislative conflicts that 
could not be resolved in Congress and so are handed over to 
the bureaucracy. In this sense, bureaucratic administration
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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represents an extension of the legislative process as 
particular parties work to advance their interests by
90lobbying in the offices of the bureaucracy.
In policymaking matters as well, public management does 
not remain neutral. They have interests of their own, and 
they push those interests vigorously in the political 
a r e n a . L i k e  most participants in the political system, 
bureaucrats usually claim that the programs they administer 
serves the public interest and that expansion of those 
programs would benefit the nation. Some of these claims are 
cynical, but most are entirely sincere. Believing in the 
value of and the need for their programs, bureaucrats seek 
to expand or protect those programs by lobbying for 
favorable legislation and increased appropriations. The 
EPA, for example, actively lobbies for funds to clean up 
toxic waste sites, and the Department of Agriculture 
regularly presses for dairy price supports and other farm 
subsidies.
Bureaucratic Challenges
The development of the service economy implies a 
revision of fundamental philosophical assumptions— for 
example, concepts such as economic value and productive 
activity. This new trend may adversely affect the 
productive value of unpaid activities such as those
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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performed by volunteers. It may also mean that service 
functions of the economy such as research and development, 
distribution, quality control, logistics, financial 
engineering, recycling, and environmental control, "are now 
at the center of all strategic decision upon which optimum 
use of human, material, and financial resources and our
3 1prospects for sound economic development depend. Since
two-thirds of all productive activities are taking place 
where consumers are, the functions of producer and consumer 
merge into prosumer. This new type of economy will 
drastically affect traditional input-output thinking.
The emergence of the service economy, changes in the 
supply and demand for skilled and unskilled labor, and the 
new information technology have already started to change 
the concept and operationalization of labor. Shifts in 
manufacturing, the growth of the service industry, and new 
information technology are turning capital-labor 
relationships, organizational structures and procedures, and 
the borderlines of virtual and actual organizations into 
something managers have never before experienced.
The growing number of employees who are telecommuting 
encourages the relocation of activities to satellite offices 
and presents agencies and public administrators with other
33new challenges. As the information superhighway evolves 
from "drawing board to reality, such related services as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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machine and software maintenance and management, training,
and security may soon account for more than half the
workforce. According to public management expert,
Bronson Rurup,
There will be an end to traditional organizational 
patterns based on an intensive division of labor 
and...these will be replaced by more extensive work 
models... this will be associated with the increased use 
of new kinds of measuring, testing, and analysis 
technology that will include the use of expert systems 
and artificial intelligence... furthermore, the new 
technologies will open up new possibilities of 
performance monitoring, performance appraisal, and
• • 35supervisions.
Rurup concludes that the work of the future will be more 
skilled, more complex, and also more strongly oriented 
towards the processing of information.^^ However, at 
present, skilled laborers are being pushed into menial jobs 
in the service industry as they are replaced by automation 
and outsourcing across the international boundaries. The 
opposition of organized labor in the United States and 
Canada to NAFTA is an indication of the growing concerns of 
employees about job security and working conditions.
Managers also face conflicting messages about what they 
should pursue. One example is that for ten years, total 
quality management (TQM) has advocated teamwork and group 
spirit. However, a recent best-seller recommends "putting 
aside the Japanese model of the received wisdom of two 
hundred years of Western industrial management to capitalize
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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on the same characteristics that have traditionally made 
Americans such great business innovators: individualism,
self-reliance, a willingness to accept risk, and a
-5 0propensity for change. ® For managers in the United States 
and abroad, whether in the public or in the private sector, 
the implication of these conflicting messages is clear: 
part of the challenge of management involves a better 
understanding of what management is all about in these 
uncertain times.
Whatever managers decide to do, both in dealing with 
immediate problems and in preparing for the future, there is 
no escape from a critical evaluation of current practices 
and situations. Just as the present is not the precise 
result of the events, trends, and conditions of the 
immediate past, so the future is not likely to evolve as a 
projection of the forces that shape the present. As others 
have noted, determining which administrative trends, 
institutions, structures, policies, or procedures may shape 
the future is another challenge for both academicians and 
practitioners.
Invention vs. Eyp.i.ytloh
Such a challenge cannot be met with successs without 
some discussion on two metaphors of reform--invention and 
evolution. The metaphor of invention came out of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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founders' own preoccupation with Newtonian mechanism. They 
thought it possible to create a self-checking governmental 
apparatus, a "machine that would go of itself." Thomas 
Jefferson urged that structures of government be abolished 
and reinvented every twentieth Independence Day. When 
William Gladstone described the U.S. Constitution as "the 
greatest work ever struck off by the mind and wit of man," 
he was invoking the imagery of institutional invention, as 
was James Bryce when he wrote admiringly of our political 
system as the "federal contrivance.
In addition, America's historical experience of 
inventors such as Eli Whitney, Thomas Edison, and Henry Ford 
have become folk icons. Thus, John J. Dilulio, a professor 
of politics and public affairs at Princeton University and 
non resident senior fellow at Brookings, concludes that it 
is natural to identify constructive change with the act of 
invention, and probably just as natural to suppose that some 
reinventing may be in order when institutional change seems 
n e e d e d . I n d e e d ,  much of the appeal today of David 
Osborne's and Ted Gaebler's Reinventing Government derives 
from the resonance of their main metaphor with American 
political culture. They write of catalytic government.
Their "map" as they term it, for a new world of governance 
is itself a catalytic image, intended as much to galvanize 
action as to describe reality. Similarly, the metaphor of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
invention, which gives their book its thematic unity and 
resonance, serves more a catalytic than an analytic purpose. 
"The can-do spirit, change effected through ingenious new 
combinations of parts, reform as the product of a single 
creative event— these are among the ideas evoked by the 
self-conception as an invention people.
The metaphor of evolution has as much intellectual 
support as does the metaphor of invention. If our 
Constitution was invented, it was also left open and 
adaptable, to better accommodate developments that "could 
not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its 
begetters," as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes commented 
The doctrine of Social Darwinism no longer commands the kind 
of assent it once did. But the thoroughness with which 
Americans embraced the evolutionary paradigm when it first 
appeared suggests that gradualists such as Charles Darwin, 
Herbert Spencer, and Alfred Marshall, though Britons 
themselves, expounded a truth that citizens of the United 
States accept almost instinctively
One of the basic concepts of contemporary social 
science, bounded rationality, supports the evolutionary 
approach to institutional reform. According to the bounded 
rationality hypothesis, policymakers mostly delude 
themselves when they think that "comprehensive study" or 
"bold inventive action” can produce useful, enduring change.
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The world of politics is too rich in both information and 
uncertainty; once-and-for-all efforts of structural reform 
must fail. As Dilulio notes, "when used as an evocative 
symbol, the metaphor of invention can help concentrate the 
mind, charge the imagination, perhaps inspire a certain 
willing suspension of disbelief." However, the inventive 
approach has its limits as a guide to practical action. The 
elements of public management cannot be detached from their 
political and institutional contexts in ways that would 
permit them to be manipulated inventively.
The primary teaching of many contemporary scholars 
suggests that projects for institutional reform may produce 
unintended consequences, frequently unwanted ones. "We are 
limited in the administrative knowledge that we already 
possess. We are still struggling to process information 
about the Old World governance, let alone about anyone's 
imagined map for a New World. As important as
bureaucracy and the management thereof, is important to any 
government, it is essential to understand the foundation on 
which the bureaucracy is based. The United States' 
bureaucracy and policy of public management is based on the 
theories and observations of Max Weber. Although numerous 
reforms have occurred since his time, it is generally 
contended that the current system of public management is 
based upon his principles. Thus, the following chapter will
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first discuss Weber's theory of bureaucracy, and then look 
at subsequent reform movements that have had a significant 
impact on bureaucracy.
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II-. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
Classical Bureaucracy Model
Max Weber's work on bureaucracies is now more than 8 0 
years old. Weber's work is known as the prime example of 
"classic" bureaucratic theory, and every subsequent theory 
of organization either takes it as its theoretical starting 
point or as an indispensable foil against which to raise new 
questions or argue alternate emphases. For most, it is
either the model one loves or the model one loves to hate.
Max Weber was the first modern theorist of society and 
organization. He introduced the concept of ideal-typical 
organizations, and the literature is still dominated by his
vision. Weber was concerned with questions relating to what
holds societies together and why.
To have an understanding of how societies held together 
and functioned, Weber made one of his central focuses the 
legitimacy of the state based on a u t h o r i t y H e  reasoned 
that if we could understand authority, we might be able to 
trace what motivated people--and how and why they related 
and acted as they did. According to Weber, there were three 
types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-
rational. Each represented a distinct way of relating to 
the world and of ordering it. Each had a dynamic and style 
of its own that dominated its cultural setting.*^®
23
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Traditional authority was based on just what one would 
expect: tradition. For example, a royal family would rule 
because of tradition, or a tribal leader would be chosen by 
traditional methods. Organizationally, traditional 
authority was found in patriarchies and matriarchies. This 
type of authority seems to have been driven out by what 
scholars identify as modernization,^^
Charismatic authority comes from the personal strength, 
magnetism, or aura of a single person. Prophets and 
heroes are the most obvious types of charismatic leaders. 
Organizationally, these leaders have a small group of 
advisors and a large, unorganized following. Again, the 
principles of modernization seem to be directly opposed to 
this kind of authority and soon overcame it.
Unlike tradition or charisma, legal-rational authority 
relies on laws and rests on impersonal positions. It can be 
thought of as a closed system with regulations and a 
hierarchy of roles that create what we recognize as a 
bureaucracy.^^ In this arrangement, modern loyalty is 
devoted to impersonal and functional purposes. As Weber 
stated, "Behind the functional purposes, of course, ideas of 
culture and values usually stand.
Weber's model was intended to identify systematically 
the necessary components of a well-structured government 
bureaucracy. He prescribed the following key elements:
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1. Division of labor and functional specialization : 
Work is divided according to type and purpose, with 
clear areas of jurisdiction marked out for each working 
unit and an emphasis on eliminating overlapping and 
duplication of functions.
2. Hierarchy: A clear vertical chain of command in 
which each unit is subordinate to the one above it and 
superior to the one below it.
3. Formal framework of rules and procedures:
Designed to ensure stability, predictability, and 
impersonality in bureaucratic operations and thus equal 
treatment for all who deal with the organization as 
well as reliability of performance.
4. Maintenance of files and other records: To ensure
that actions taken are both appropriate to the 
situation and consistent with past actions in similar 
circumstances.
5. Professionalization: Employees who are a) 
appointed (not elected) on the basis of their 
qualifications and job-related skills, b) full-time 
and career oriented, and c) paid a regular salary and 
provided with benefits such as health insurance and a
«■5retirement pension.
In addition to these explicit components, two other elements 
should be mentioned. Weber obviously intended a government 
bureaucracy of the type described above to be endowed with 
sufficient legal and political authority to function 
adequately. His model of bureaucracy is based on both legal 
and rational authority derived from a fixed central point in 
the political process, and is assumed to function under that 
authority
This model of bureaucracy represented an effort by 
Weber to both prescribe and describe what he saw as the
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ideal form of organization, as it was then emerging in early 
twentieth-century Europe. It is a formalistic model and 
lacks dimensions later recognized as important, such as 
informal lines of authority, internal communication, concern 
for individual behavior, and motivation in the bureaucracy. 
Also, Weber himself indicated that the model was not meant 
to apply to all conceivable organizational situations. It 
represented only a broad framework rather than an all- 
encompassing model. Despite these limitations, the Weberian 
model was the first effort to define systematically the 
dimensions of this new form of social organization and to 
prescribe or explain its operations in abstract and 
theoretical terms.
One of the central goals of Weber’s model was to make 
possible an optimum degree of control in an organization.^^ 
The quest for control lay at the heart of virtually every 
element of the model. In particular, the formalism 
suggested by rules, procedures, and the exercise of 
authority through a hierarchy, point to Weber's overriding 
concern for organization that would be both smoothly 
functioning and effectively managed. In this formal theory 
and in others proposed at the time, to the extent that 
management concerns are emphasized, the ultimate goal is 
control from the top down, over all organizational 
activities and needs. Consequently, in order to facilitate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
control there is a preoccupation with encouraging uniformity 
rather than permitting diversity in values as well as 
behavior within the organization.^^ In today's complex and 
regulated society, this generalization has important 
political as well as managerial applications and 
implications, especially for well-educated knowledge workers 
in large bureaucracies.
A comparison of the Weberian model to contemporary 
American public administration illustrates the model's 
attractiveness to serve as a yardstick against which to 
measure actual administrative arrangements and the 
limitations on its applicability to very different times and 
circumstances- American public bureaucracies operate within 
a formal framework of vertical hierarchy, extensive division 
of labor and specialization, specific rules, procedures, and 
routines, and a high degree of professionalization complete 
with extensive merit systems, career emphases, and salary
«7and fringe benefits. Yet, in spite of these similarities, 
there are equally prominent differences.
First, although there is a hierarchy comprising the 
formal bureaucratic structure, those within that hierarchy 
respond to commands, incentives, and decisions that arise
COfrom outside it. Thus, the hierarchy is often only one of 
the chains of command active in the bureaucracy which is
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often described as a reflection of the U.S.'s political 
diversity.
Second, Weber's division of labor and specialization 
was designed to reduce functional overlap among bureaucratic 
units. This provision would insure that any functions 
performed by a given entity were the responsibility of only 
that e n t i t y - I n  Weber's view, this was in the best 
interest of efficient operation. In contrast, American 
bureaucracy has functional overlap in spite of its 
specialization- This reflects overlapping political 
jurisdictions and societal interests. For example, an 
occupational retraining program could logically be placed 
under the authority of either the Department of Labor, since 
the program is vocationally focused, or Department of 
Education, since it emphasizes training. Furthermore, 
functional overlap is practically guaranteed in a federal 
system in which separate governments organize their 
bureaucracies independently.
Third, the kind of professionalization foreseen by 
Weber has been only partially achieved in American 
bureaucracy, in part due to matters of definition. Weber's 
European "professionals" were so defined because they were 
making the bureaucracy their careers, were competent to 
perform the tasks for which they were hired, and were paid 
in the manner that other professionals were paid. American
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bureaucracy differs from the European model in two respects. 
First, in this country, there is a wide variety of personnel 
systems, ranging from the fully developed m^erit system in 
which job-related competence is the most important 
qualification for employment to the most open, deliberate 
patronage system in which political loyalty and connections 
are the major criteria in personnel decisions. The U.S. 
Civil Service, several states, and many city-manager model 
cities make personnel decisions largely based on a merit 
basis. Patronage is found in many states as well as in 
numerous urban and rural governments throughout the country- 
-sometimes even when a merit system appears to be in 
operation
Another departure from the Weberian ideal of 
professionalism is that more and more professions in the 
private sector--law, medicine, engineering, social and 
physical sciences, and business management— are represented 
among government employees. Whereas Weber seemed to be 
seeking a "professional bureaucrat," the American experience 
has produced "bureaucratic professionals"--persons trained 
in various private-sector professions who find careers in 
the public s e r v i c e . W e b e r ' s  conception appears to be 
narrower than the American reality with regard to the scope 
and diversity of skills of his bureaucrats, as well as the 
variety of their professional loyalties.
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A further implication of professionalization is that 
employees of a Weberian bureaucracy would be judged by their 
continuing competence in their jobs. In this regard, 
American merit systems also diverge from Weber's model 
In the majority of cases, those who secure a merit position 
need only to serve a probationary period (usually six to 
eighteen months) before earning job security. How rapidly 
one rises through the ranks or how easily one can transfer 
to a new position may well be affected by periodic 
evaluations of competence, but it is still the exception 
rather than the rule to find a public employee dismissed 
solely for incompetence on the job.
Finally, Weber placed considerable emphasis on career 
employment. It is only since 1955, however, that the 
national government, some states, and localities, have 
attempted to structure their personnel systems so as to 
foster a career emphasis as an integral part of public- 
sector employment.
Although American public administration has emulated 
many of the elements of Weber's model, the applicability of 
that model in the United States is limited in important 
respects. The fundamental strength of Weber's model lay in 
its defining and describing bureaucracy as a structure of 
social organization, as a means of promoting hierarchical 
control, and in paving the way for further theory,
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explanation, and prescription regarding large and complex 
organizations.
Scientific Management’s Contributions
The development of Frederick Taylor’s theory of 
scientific management marked the beginning of the managerial 
tradition in organization theory. Taylor's theory was 
designed to assist .private-sector management in adapting 
production practices to the needs of an emerging industrial 
economy in the early 1900s. Prior to Taylor's research, 
there was little systematic organization of work in private 
industry. His writings became the principal source of ideas 
on the subject. Unlike Weber, Taylor focused on private 
industry and prescribed a "science of management" that 
incorporated specific steps and procedures for 
implementation. Weber's more abstract model of bureaucracy 
did not specify actual operations. Both men, however, 
emphasized formal structure and rules, dealt hardly at all 
with the employees' working environment, and directly or 
indirectly equated the control needs of those at the top of 
the hierarchy with the needs of the organization as a whole.
The theory of scientific management rested on four 
underlying values. The first was efficiency in production, 
which involved obtaining the maximum benefit or gain 
possible from a given investment of resources. The second
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was rationality in work procedures, which addressed the 
arrangement of work in the most direct relationship to 
objectives sought. The third was productivity, which meant 
maintaining the highest production levels possible. The 
fourth was profit, which Taylor conceived of as the ultimate 
objective of everyone within the organization. These values 
formed the framework within which the remainder of his 
theory has been applied.
Taylor made several other critical assumptions. He 
viewed organizational authority as highly centralized at top 
management levels. He assumed a hierarchy of mid-level 
managers and supervisors through which top management 
conveyed orders to those below. At each level of the 
organization, responsibility and authority were fixed at a 
central point. Taylor also believed that there was "one 
best way" to perform any particular task, that through 
scientific research, method could be discovered and applied. 
Taylor maintained that the ideal method for performing a 
certain task could be taught to workers responsible for that 
task, and scientific selection of workers for their 
capabilities in performing the task(s ) would be the most 
rational way to achieve the organization's overall 
obj ect ives.
According to Taylor, management needed to do three 
things to increase productivity and thus profits. First,
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the most efficient tools and procedures had to be developed. 
Here, Taylor relied on time-and-motion studies, which 
concentrated on identifying the most economical set of 
physical movements associated with each step of a work 
process. Taylor was a pioneer in such studies, although he 
was only one of a number of researchers in this area.
Second, in teaching the new techniques to workers, emphasis 
was to be placed on standardizing the procedures in order to 
enable workers to discharge their responsibilities routinely 
yet efficiently. Third, criteria that emphasized task- 
related capabilities needed to be developed for, and applied 
to, the worker selection p r o c e s s . A g a i n ,  top management 
was to be entirely responsible for implementing this science 
of administration.
As with any model or theory, there were shortcomings in 
the application of scientific management to industry and, 
later, to government. A theoretical shortcoming that 
received considerable attention from later scholars was that 
under scientific management, the worker was seen as merely a 
cog in the industrial machine, with motives and incentives 
that were purely financial and no other needs, on or off the 
job that were worthy of incorporation into the theory. 
Consequently, Taylor concentrated on viewing workers 
narrowly.
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Taylor's theory encountered significant difficulties 
when American industry tried to implement it. Taylor had 
assumed that management and labor would share the same 
objectives and that there would be no conflict over 
organizing to achieve them. He believed that management 
would naturally seek efficiency, rationality, and 
productivity in order to maximize profits. Taylor thought 
that labor would support and work toward those same goals 
because, at the time, laborers were paid by the piece, and 
would earn more money as production increased. Thus, Taylor 
projected a united labor-management interest in his science 
of management. The problem was that this unity of interest 
was assumed without accounting for how it might be affected 
by the law of supply and demand. In the simplest terms, 
Taylor projected that demand for a product would always keep 
pace with supply, that maximum productivity would always be 
a goal of both management and workers. In practice, 
however, production levels sometimes came to exceed market 
demand for a p r o d u c t W h e n  this occurred, management laid 
off some workers, retaining only the number needed on the 
job for each to maintain maximum productivity without 
causing total output to exceed demand. This touched off 
vigorous opposition by workers who were laid off by unions. 
Most industrial managers had enough power to withstand
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labor’s reaction, but Taylor's theory came under increasing 
criticism.
Taylor inaugurated a new direction in organization 
theory and management practice. Scientific management took 
hold not only in the private sector but also in public 
administration. For a time, the values of efficiency, 
rationality, and productivity were virtually official 
doctrine in the national bureaucracy. Eventually, an 
important body of theory in public administration evolved 
largely from Taylor's work. Scientific management has had a 
lasting influence on organization theory. It has ideally 
shaped the values and structures in numerous private and 
public enterprises and has indirectly influenced 
organization theory as other theories either followed from 
it or developed in reaction to it.
Public Choice Theory
Some microeconomists have developed a different theory 
to explain public management. Public-choice theory begins 
with the bedrock of all economics, the assumption that human 
beings are rational and seek to maximize things that are in 
their self-interest.^^ Whether choosing where to live or 
what car to buy, economists argue, individuals attempt to 
maximize their utility, the value they derive from their 
decision. In the private sector, this makes individuals and
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corporations competitive and leads to the most efficient 
distribution of resources.
Public choice theory argues that public officials, like 
all other individuals, seek to maximize their self-interest. 
Their self-interest leads them to avoid risk and to promote 
their careers. That, in turn, means that they seek to 
enlarge their programs and increase their budgets. As a 
result, public choice economists argue, an organization full 
of self-interested bureaucrats is likely to produce bigger 
government that is both inefficient and operating against 
the public's interest. Bureaucrats' pursuit of self- 
interest helps explain the often disappointing performance 
of American government
This argument, in turn, has led proponents of the
public choice school to argue that, wherever possible,
governmental functions ought to be turned over to the
private sector. In fact, from the Japanese government's
sale of the nation's largest airline to Mexico's sale of 250
government-owned corporations, governments around the world
have followed the public choice prescription for privatizing
public services. Where this proves impossible, either for
practical or for political reasons, public choice proponents
contend that public functions ought to be contracted out to
70the private s e c t o r . T h e  contracting process would 
simulate private-sector competition and dilute the influence
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of government bureaucrats. As Stuart Butler, one of the 
movement's strongest voices, put it, privatization is a kind 
of "political guerrilla warfare" that directs demand away 
from government provision of services and reduces the demand 
for budget growth.
The Grace Commission, appointed by President Reagan to 
study the federal government's management, picked up on 
these themes in the mid-1980s. First, the commission 
contended, inefficient management gets rewarded with higher 
appropriations and more staff. Since the current year's 
budget is usually based on the money spent last year, the 
incentive is to spend all of the money appropriated whether 
it is needed or not. There is no incentive to conserve 
money for return to the Treasury. Second, because 
government is insulated from competition, it need not 
change. Public agencies can continue on, year after year, 
administering programs the same way. Finally, powerful 
constituencies grow up around government programs and 
protect them from the need to change and adapt. Interest 
groups often fight change to safeguard their share of 
government goods and services. As a result, government is 
not forced to operate efficiently, and nearly everyone 
involved in the administration of government programs has an 
interest in keeping it that way.
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The public choice approach has also led to innovative 
regulatory strategies. Rather than have government issue 
rules that require any industry that creates pollution to 
reduce impurities below a fixed ceiling, regulators can 
create incentives for industries to reduce pollution more 
efficiently. The Environmental Protection Agency, for 
example, set pollution standards for firms. Companies that 
reduced their pollution below prescribed levels could "band" 
their pollution savings for use in future expansion. Other 
companies, since 1979, have been allowed to establish a 
"bubble" around all their facilities in an area and decide 
the cheapest way to reduce overall pollution, rather than 
have to deal with individual rules applying to each 
polluting f a c i l i t y I n  both pollution banking and 
bubbles, the strategy is to allow each company's assessment 
of its self-interest to promote the overall goal of reducing 
pollution.
In 1980, for example, the first bubble plan approved 
saved an electric utility $27 million. It substituted high- 
sulfur coal for low-sulfur coal at one plant, and switched 
to natural gas from low-sulfur coal at another. The bubble 
plan not only saved the utility substantial money but 
reduced emissions. DuPont engineers estimated that a 
regional bubble for the company's operations could produce 
an 85 percent reduction in pollution for $14.6 million in
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costs. If the company reduced each source of pollution by 
85 percent, it would have cost more than seven times ($91 
million)
The public choice approach to decision-making attacks 
governmental programs with a simple diagnosis— that the 
self-interest of government officials produces inefficient 
programs. It also offered a simple prescription— to turn 
over as many public programs as possible to the private 
sector. The approach, however, leaves significant questions 
of both information and values unanswered.
The attraction of the public choice approach to 
decision making lies in its reliance on the market. 
Proponents believe that marketlike competition, whether 
actually in the market or in market-based mechanisms such as 
contracts, enhances efficiency. Decision makers are driven 
to seek the right information and make the best decisions.
If they do not, others will be more efficient and they will 
lose their jobs. The power of this logic rests on the basic 
assumption of the bureaucrat as a rational actor. In other 
words, administrators will single-mindedly pursue things of 
immediate utility for themseIves--personal power, security, 
and income.
It is difficult to argue that any individual does not 
look to enhance his or her position. Nevertheless, Steven 
Kelman contends, this account of the operation of the
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political process is a terrible caricature of reality. It 
ignores the ability of ideas to defeat interests, and the 
role that public spirit plays in motivating the behavior of 
participants in the he political process. The public choice 
argument is far worse than simply descriptively inaccurate. 
Achieving good public policy requires a norm of public 
spiritedness in the political action— a view that people 
should not simply be selfish in their political behavior.
The public choice school is part of the assault on this
' 75norm.
It is difficult to accept the notion that, in 
administering government programs, government bureaucrats 
are driven exclusively to maximize their own utility—  
resulting in more publicly-oriented objectives slipping out 
of sight. Thus, the theory's very simplicity may be its 
undoing. Are bureaucratic officials really so single-minded 
of purpose that there is no room for pride in performance, 
for striving to meet the goals of legislation, for a sense 
of public service in the public interest?
Many top administrators could doubtless double or 
triple their salaries in the private sector. A sense of 
devotion to the public good keeps them working in the public 
s e c t o r . A n  approach to the public service that starts 
with a cynical view of public servants is dangerously 
flawed, especially when used as a prescription for managing
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government programs- Moreover, some economists, such as
former chairman of the President's Council of Economic
Advisers, Murray Weidenbaum, contend, that there is a
tendency to dismiss difficult questions as "subjective and
political," thus defining them as outside the proper sphere
of rational analysis of efficiency.
The public choice movement's great attraction is its
explanation of government problems that dovetails neatly
with the antigovernment feeling that grew in the aftermath
of Watergate and the conservative philosophy championed by
the Reagan administration. Moreover, it offers a simple
solution: replace the decisions of government bureaucrats
with the allegedly self-correcting influence of the market.
Markets, it is argued, eliminate the need for a conscious
search for decision-making information, since the self-
interested motivations of the participants ensure that
7Rrelevant data are available. ° However, this explanation
greatly oversimplifies problems with which public managers
must deal and feeds an unhealthy cynicism about government
and the public service. The approach greatly underestimates
the tremendous power of public ideas: the notion that some
things are good for all of us, and that decision makers seek
79to achieve those things.
The market analogy suggests that both the goals and the 
motives of the private sector are identical with those of
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the public s e c t o r . A r g u m e n t s  for privatization, however, 
sometimes muddle together two very different issues: what
government should do, and how government should do it. Most 
fundamentally, privatization is an argument about how the 
government does things, not what it ought to do.
This raises an important question: What functions are
public and thus a responsibility for government? As noted 
earlier, efficiency is not the only goal of public programs, 
and seeking other important goals, such as equality, 
typically means making difficult tradeoffs. Some programs 
are, at their core, public. The deepest debates are usually 
ones of ends--what should or should not be public 
functions?— and the public choice movement's focus on means 
thus leads to a crucial point. There is, quite simply, a 
public interest in public administration.
Even if means is the sole focus, the public choice 
approach is still unsatisfying. Public choice proponents 
typically assume that the self-regulating feature of the 
market will solve any problems plaguing public programs. 
Instruments are not neutral, however, and the long history 
of government contracts, as well as more recent lapses in 
government discretion, offer ample reason to question the 
theory.
The point is very simple, yet often overlooked: 
contracts do not administer themselves. Moreover, relying
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on contracts often replaces one set of values with another, 
if directly administered government programs must deal with 
self-interested bureaucrats, contracted-out programs must 
deal with self-interested proxies, each of which seeks to 
maximize its own utility, sometimes at the government's 
expense. Contracts must, themselves, be administered to 
ensure high accountability and performance. The role of 
government administrators is different, but it does not 
disappear. As Eli Freedman of Connecticut Commission of 
Administration argues, "You can't contract away 
responsibility to m a n a g e . A s  any defense official facing 
harsh questions about overpriced weapons could tell, 
contracting out does not eliminate the government's basic 
responsibility. It only changes them.
The public choice prescription laid the fundamental 
ground work for the current entrepreneurial reform movement 
known as "reinventing government." Public choice activists 
believe that there is an irreducible governmental role in 
shaping government. This distinction is currently 
illustrated by the Clinton administration's endorsement of 
the reinventing government movement. As such, the following 
chapter will outline and discuss the reinventing government 
movement as articulated by its creators, David Osborne and 
Ted Gaebler.
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III. THE ’'REINVENTING GOVERNMENT” REFORM MOVEMENT
Public choice theory has contributed to an increasingly 
popular movement: reinventing government. There has been a
world-wide push for bureaucratic change. The past few years 
have been a time of renewed interest in public service 
reform at all levels of government. In 1990, the National 
Commission of the Public Service, chaired by former Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman, Paul A. Ulcker, issued its report 
which focused on the federal service. In 1993, the National 
Commission on the State and Local Public Service, chaired by 
former Mississippi Governor William F. Winter, presented its 
report to President Clinton. Then, the National Performance 
Review, commissioned by President Clinton, directed by Vice- 
President Gore, and largely inspired by David Osborne and 
Ted Gaebler’s Reinventing Government, pushed for radical 
bureaucratic reform.
The issues surfacing in the early 1990s centered around 
the widespread public perception that government was 
functioning less and less effectively, and that many small 
problems within government bureaucracy had multiplied and 
combined into larger problems. In particular, calls for 
"reinventing government” were heard, suggesting that 
government should give its utmost attention to serving its 
customers well and should try to instill an entrepreneurial
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spirit into as many of its operations as possible.
Journalist David Osborne and former city manager Ted Gaebler 
have attracted a considerable following with their 
prescription for reinventing government, which has been 
publicly endorsed by many people at all levels, both in and 
outside of government.
Much of the allure of this book is derived from its 
diagnosis of the causes of inadequate federal performance 
and its energetic prescriptions for change. The diagnosis: 
a bureaucracy staffed by well-meaning officials who find 
themselves hamstrung by illogical procedures and pulled in 
unproductive directions by perverse incentives. The 
prescription: decentralize government and create incentives
to promote entrepreneurial activity by government workers.
Reinventing Government reminded everyone that 
government is, after all, in business to serve citizens, not 
its own employees. The book established the critical 
importance of a good working relationship between government 
and the private sector. Perhaps most important, it raised 
the debate on the quality of government performance to a 
level not seen in a generation.
Gaebler and Osborne note that the U.S. government was 
last "reinvented” during the early decades of the twentieth 
century, roughly from 1900 through 1940. This period, known 
as the Progressive Era and the New Deal, focused on coping
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with the emergence of a new industrial economy^ which
created vast new problems and vast new opportunities in
American life. Similarly, there has been a current push
to reinvent government. Gaebler and Osborne base their
conclusions on the following premises: First, governments
are needed. Government is the mechanism to make communal
decisions, and it is how decisions are made that is
important. Second, civilized society cannot function
effectively without effective government. The governments
of today were created for industrial-era governments, with
large, centralized bureaucracies and standardized, "one-
size-fits-all" services. Third, the people who work in
government are not the problem; it is the systems in which
they work that are the problem. Fourth, neither traditional
liberalism nor traditional conservatism has much relevance
to the problems governments face today. Finally, equity is
the key factor for the American system; there are ways to
use choice and competition to increase equity in the public 
84sector.
Based on the above premises, the authors describe an 
entrepreneurial government to deal with modern challenges. 
"Entrepreneur" was defined by J.B. Say, around the year 
1800. "The entrepreneur shifts economic resources out of an 
area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and 
greater y i e l d . I n  other words, as used by Gaebler and
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Osborne, an entrepreneur uses resources in new ways to 
maximize productivity and effectiveness. Thus, their 
entrepreneurial model describes those public institutions 
that habitually act in ways that utilize resources in new 
ways to heighten both efficiency and effectiveness.
The basis of the "reinventing government" concept is 
that the central failure of government is one of means, not 
ends. In other words, what government does is important, 
but how they do it is even more so. The authors of this 
concept believe that the last fifty years have centered too 
specifically on the ends of government, thus leaving the 
means neglected.
The current bureaucratic system was created during the 
Progressive Era out of a desire to control rampant 
corruption within government institutions. Measures were 
enacted to keep politicians and bureaucrats from doing 
anything that might endanger the public interest or purse. 
This cleaned up much of government, but in solving one set 
of problems, it created another. According to Gaebler and 
Osborne,
In making it difficult to steal the public's money, we 
made it virtually impossible to manage the public's 
money. In adopting written tests scored to the third 
decimal point to hire our clerks and police officers 
and fire fighters, we built mediocrity into out work 
force. In making it impossible to fire people who did 
not perform, we turned mediocrity into deadwood. In 
attempting to control virtually everything, we became
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so obsessed with dictating how things should be done 
that we ignored the outcomes, the results.
Thus, the product was government with a distinct tendency
toward slow, inefficient, and impersonal output. This model
worked for many years because it solved the many problems
associated with its era.
The era in which the Progressive model was created was
strikingly different than the contemporary era. It was a
slower-paced society which experienced change at a slower
pace. It was also an age of top-down hierarchy; only those
few officials at the top of the pyramid had enough
information to make informed decisions. In addition it was
an era of mass markets and strong geographic communities
which developed similar wants and needs.
However, society is now one of rapid change. There now
exists a global marketplace, which greatly affects economic
institutions. In addition, this is an information age, in
which people have by-the-minute access to global
information. The economy is also knowledge-based, which
means educated workers struggle with commands and demand
autonomy. Most importantly, today is the era of customer
service, in which customers have become accustomed to high
quality and extensive choice.
Because of these changes, it is the authors' belief
that today's environment demands institutions that deliver
high-quality goods and services, squeezing ever more bang
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out of every buck. It demands institutions that are
responsive to their customers, offering choices of
nonstandardized services; that lead by persuasion and
incentives rather than commands; that give their employees a
sense of meaning and control, even ownership. It demands
institutions that empower citizens rather than simply
87serving them.®'
C.aLaît±c,._G■Ql̂:ex■̂ms■ILt
The first proposal is to introduce a more catalytic
style government. This type of institution would "steer
88more and row less." In other words, the government would 
focus on actively shaping the public sector, making more 
policy decisions, activating more social and economic 
institutions, and instituting more deregulation. However, 
rather than hiring more public employees, a catalytic 
government would make sure other institutions were 
delivering services and meeting the communities needs.
Thus, the public service sector would be more of an 
enforcing mechanism behind policies, rather than the actual 
manpower that enacts those policies.
It must be noted that most people have been taught that 
the public and private sectors occupy distinct worlds; that 
government should not interfere with business, and that 
business should have no part in government. This was a
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central tenet of the bureaucratic model. Gaebler and 
Osborne maintain that this belief is out of date. 
Governments today, under intense pressure to solve problems 
without spending new money, look for the best method they 
can find, regardless of which sector it involves. Indeed, 
there are very few services traditionally provided by the 
public sector that are not today provided somewhere by the 
private sector— and vice versa.
Businesses are running public schools and fire 
departments. Governments are operating professional 
sports teams and running venture capital funds. 
Nonprofits are rehabilitating convicts, running banks,
and developing real estate.
The line between public and private business may have 
already become too blurred to distinguish between the two. 
The bottomline remains that whoever is best equipped to 
provide the most efficient service should be the one to do 
so.
Many have assumed that Gaebler and Osborne are arguing 
for privatization. However, they offer privatization as 
only one answer, not the answer. Privatization may be the 
correct answer in certain circumstances. The main 
distinction is that "services can be contracted out or 
turned over to the private sector. But governance 
cannot. Government is the mechanism by which the public 
makes collective decisions, thus it cannot ever be totally 
privatized. If it were, the people would have no way to
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enforce rules of behavior, no way to set rules of 
marketplace, and there would be a loss of all sense of 
equity and altruism. In addition, services that could 
generate a profit, such as housing for the homeless, would 
barely exist because third sector organizations could never 
shoulder the entire load.
Community-owned Government
Another concept covered by Gaebler and Osborne is that 
of putting ownership of the government back into the hands 
of the people. Traditionally, the feeling has been that 
government is owned by the bureaucracy that runs it. This 
belief began when government took over tasks previously 
administered by third sector institutions, such as churches, 
families, and neighborhoods.
As control was transferred from the third sector to the 
government, unforeseen consequences emerged. For example, 
the many movements for increased welfare, tenant, urban, 
family, and individual rights erupted. These movements were 
the cause of a mindset that real control over individual 
lives had been lost to the mega-institutions of society: 
big business, big government, and big labor.
The motivation for instilling ownership of the 
government into the public is that people will become more 
involved. Currently, there has been increased involvement
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in recycling programs, education, and crime and drug 
prevention. Government set the goals, allowed the public to 
become involved, and the process of achieving the goal is 
being carried out.
The difference between the public and private sector is 
illuminated in the concept of ownership. For example, 
communities have more commitment to their members than 
service delivery systems have to their clients. Also, 
communities understand the problems better than service 
professionals. Expefiencing a situation will often result 
in motivation to correct any problems resulting from that 
situation.
In addition, professional bureaucracies deliver 
services while communities solve problems. For example, the 
City of Boston is forcing its hospitals to expand their 
services for pregnant women in Boston*s black neighborhoods, 
where infant mortality is on the rise. But anyone who reads 
the newspaper knows that the problem is not simply a lack of 
medical services. The problems are poverty, drug addiction, 
teenage sex, and the dissolution of the black family. More 
medical services will have very little impact unless 
something is done for the extenuating circumstances as 
well
A community-owned government is also cheaper than 
service professionals. When government is in control of
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providing services, much of the wealth from government flows 
to its own workers rather than the supposed recipients. For 
example, in 1984, federal state, and local governments spent 
$6,209 per poor person in Cook county. However, only 35 
percent of this money reached the poor in the form of cash. 
Another 13 percent came as food stamps and rent vouchers.
The majority, 52.6 percent, went to service providers.
Osborne and Gaebler note that when governments push 
ownership and control into the community, their 
responsibilities do not end. They may no longer produce 
services, but they are still responsible for making sure 
needs are met. When governments abdicate this steering 
responsibility, disaster often follows. The massive 
deinstitutionalization of mental patients in favor of 
community-based treatment during the 1970s was a perfect 
example. It worked in a few places, but most governments 
abdicated their steering responsibilities. They failed to 
make sure that community treatment centers and homes are in 
place, with adequate funding, and they failed to monitor 
what happened to patients who left their hospitals. As a 
result, many of the mentally ill ended up on the streets, 
homeless
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Competi tive Government
A key condition to reinventing government is injecting 
competition into service delivery. Competition will not 
solve all of government's problems. However, "it holds the 
key that will unlock the bureaucratic gridlock that 
hamstrings so many public a g e n c i e s . T h e  authors do not 
condone "cutthroat" competition which can bring out the bad 
as well as the good. Merit pay is one example. Merit pay 
for individual teacher just sets teacher against teacher.
But merit pay for schools creates competition between teams. 
The latter type of competition builds morale and encourages 
creativity.
There are many advantages of competition. For example, 
the most obvious advantage of competition is greater 
efficiency. When public service providers' jobs are 
dependent on their success, those providers become efficient 
and motivated to excel in their area. This revitalizes the 
public service sector. In addition, competition rewards 
innovation, while monopoly stifles it. Service providers 
are able to adapt to a changing environment out of their 
wish to maintain their position. However, if an 
individual's job is guaranteed to perpetuate despite that 
individual's output, the individual will be less inclined to 
excel.
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Competition will remain as the cornerstone to a healthy 
organization. Unfortunately, in today's fast-moving 
marketplace, the private sector is rapidly taking market 
share away from public organizations. This can be witnessed 
in the growing superiority of private schools, challenges to 
the U.S. postal service by Federal Express and U.P.S.
Without a healthy dose of competition within the boundaries 
of the public service sector, eventually the only customers 
who will use public services will be those who cannot afford 
an alternative.
Mission-driven Government
The concept of reinventing government also rests on the 
concept of mission-driven government, rather than rule- 
driven organizations. Rule driven government may prevent 
some corruption, but at a price of monumental waste. 
Mission-driven organization turn their employees free to 
pursue the organization's mission with the most effective 
methods they can find.
Obvious advantages of mission-driven government include 
the fact that such a system is more efficient than rule- 
driven organizations. Without manuals full of rules and 
regulations, employees are free to pursue the mission of 
their agency rather than the previous rules. This is not to 
imply that there should be an absence of any rules.
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Mission-driven organizations are also more effective 
than rule-driven organizations. They also produce better 
results. Clear goals and the autonomy to achieve them 
produces success. In addition, mission-driven organizations 
are more innovative. Rule-driven organizations stifle 
innovation, because there is always some rule that stands in 
the way.
Results-oriented Government
Another characteristic of the Gaebler and Osborne model 
is results-oriented government. The focus is on funding 
outcomes rather than inputs. The Progressive Era developed 
the process of funding inputs. For example, an agency would 
receive funding based on the amount of services they 
provided over the long haul. A results-oriented funding 
would provide funding based on the outcomes of the agency. 
For example, a state hospital might receive funding 
according to the number of beds filled, thus making 
terminally ill patients lucrative. Consequently, the number 
of bedridden patients climbed steadily over the years. 
However, under a result-oriented government, an agency would 
receive funding based on a rating system that takes factors 
such as patient satisfaction, community and family 
participation, and the quality of the nursing home 
environment, into account.
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The key to a results-oriented government is in the 
rating system. Rewards and punitive action are based on the 
measurement of agencies. The theory behind this logic is 
that people respond to measurement; if workers know that 
their livelihood is going to depend on their quality of 
work, then they will be more motivated to excel in their 
area of expertise. In addition, if a system is not 
periodically checked, not only does success go unrewarded, 
but failure cannot be identified and fixed.
Customer-driven. Government
An important aspect of reinventing government is 
producing a government that is customer-driven. The key is 
to meet the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy. The 
dilemma that exists for this goal is in identifying the 
customer Most public agents do not know who their customers 
are and this fact is further complicated because most public 
agencies do not get their funds from their customers. In 
private business, almost all of the profits come directly 
from the customer. Thus, there is a push to satisfy the 
customer in the private sector. In contrast, public 
agencies get most of their funding from legislatures, city 
councils, and elected boards. And most of their "customers" 
are captive: "short of moving, they have few alternatives
to the services their governments p r o v i d e . D u e  to this
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monopolistic environment, public managers learn to ignore 
the customer and focus on those holding the purse strings of 
their agency.
Osborne and Gaebler turn to management experts such as
Peters, Waterman, Drucker, and Deming, to point out the
importance of listening to one's customers. Those experts
counsel managers to expose their employees directly to their 
07customers. Some of their advice in getting close to the 
customer includes: Customer surveys, customer follow-up,
community surveys, customer contact, customer contact 
reports, customer councils, focus groups, customer 
interviews, electronic mail, customer service training, test 
marketing, quality guarantees, inspectors, and suggestion 
boxes or forms. All of these methods have one goal in 
common: listening to the voice of the customer.
One challenge in tracking the public sector customer 
is that most institutions have multiple sets of customers 
with conflicting interests (such as individuals, businesses, 
and the communities). The authors suggest that the single 
best way to make public service providers respond to the 
needs of their customers is "to put resources in the he
QOcustomers' hands and let them choose." ® Listening 
techniques are important, but choice overshadows it. If the 
public cannot choose between providers, then they are 
dependent upon the goodwill of the provider.
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There are many advantages for a customer-driven system.
First, such systems force service providers to be
accountable to their c u s t o m e r s . T h e  simple fact that
customers can take their business elsewhere demands that
providers constantly seek feedback on their needs and then
do what is necessary to meet them. Second, customer-driven
systems depoliticize the choice-of-provider decision.
Many times politics interferes with contracting out services
to providers. However, when customers control the
resources, no legislature can protect inferior providers
from the verdicts rendered by those customers.
A third advantage is that customer-driven systems
stimulate more innovation. According to Gaebler, "When
providers have to compete, they constantly look for ways to
cut their costs and increase their quality. And, when they
also get their funds from their customers, rather than from
a legislature, they also have far greater incentives to
107invest in innovation. " Another advantage is that people
109are given choices between different kinds of services.
Past standardization is outdated because different services 
are required by different people. It has been suggested 
that providing identical programs to all people guarantees 
unequal results--what works for some does not necessarily 
work for others.
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In addition to the above advantages, a customer-driven 
system wastes less, because it matches supply to demand. 
Customers are allowed to buy the services they want; for 
example, a dislocated worker may need medical coverage 
during his search for a new job. The old system would 
demand that the worker not only get medical coverage, but 
also be the recipient of a plethora of other benefits which 
are unwanted and unneeded, not to mention costly. Also, 
empowered customers who make such choices are more committed 
customers. And, finally, a customer-driven system creates 
greater opportunities for equity.
Enterprising Government
One of the most controversial aspects of the Osborne 
and Gaebler model is the concept of an "enterprising" 
government. A government that earns rather than spends is 
controversial because the public may resent their government 
if they suspect that the system is making money at a cost to 
tax payers. Budget revenues are not new. However, public 
employees often worry about such revenues because they are 
often penalized the following year in their annual budget or 
taxpayers revolt.
Because agencies with revenues are often penalized and 
profits are shipped back to the federal government, managers 
are not likely to pursue revenues. Indeed, if managers'
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budgets are supplied regardless of whether their departments 
earn anything, they are not likely to spend time trying to 
make money. One way to get public managers to think
like entrepreneurs is through shared savings and earnings. 
Departments are allowed to keep all or part of any funds 
they save or earn. These savings are thus available to the 
agency for projects in the future or for particularly lean 
years. Another way to instill the entrepreneur spirit in 
public managers is through innovation capital. A mission- 
driven budget allows managers to accumulate savings, which 
they can use as "seed capital. Thus, if a new
initiative arises, the initial capital is available to help 
new projects be created.
Decentralized Government
A decentralized government is central to the authors' 
plan of reinvention. Fifty years ago, centralized 
institutions were indispensable due to the lack of 
technology and communication. However, this is not the case 
today. Currently, information and technology are virtually 
limitless. One of the challenges of the modern age is that 
the pressure for accelerated decision-making "slams up hard 
against the increased complexity and unfamiliarity of the 
environment about which the decisions must be made."^^6
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In contrast, entrepreneurial leaders gravitate towards 
a more decentralized approach to decision-making. Decisions 
are moved to the periphery--into the hands of the customer, 
communities, and nongovernmental organizations. Authority 
is dispersed among employees.
Decentralization has many advantages. First, 
decentralized institutions are far more flexible than 
centralized institutions; they can respond quickly to 
changing circumstances and customers' needs. Second, 
decentralized institutions are more effective than 
centralized institutions. Frontline workers are the most 
knowledgeable about what is, or is not, needed. In 
addition, they usually have the support of those who run the 
organization.
A third advantage is that decentralized institutions 
are far more innovative than centralized institutions.
Rather than relying on a distant, disconnected agency to 
create ideas, truly great innovations come from those 
workers who are actually involved in the daily process. And 
finally, decentralized institutions generate higher morale, 
more commitment, and greater productivity. According to 
Osborne, "When managers entrust employees with important 
decisions, they signal their respect for those 
employees. This advantage is especially important in an 
educated work base, because such workers thrive on a sense
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of mutual respect (not an assembly-line mentality that 
precludes differences among employees* capacities).
Market-oriented Government
The last part of the Osborne and Gaebler model is the 
market-oriented government. The Progressive Era produced a 
decentralized system in which one program solved the 
problems of thousands of people. However, today such a 
system faces a larger problem: the ability to pay for all
of the needs of society is lacking. Thus, government has no 
choice but to find a noncentralist approach; an approach 
which will encourage businesses and individuals to meet the 
needs of society.
The trends of a market-oriented government were spurred
on by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, "a
development that has dramatized in living color the
superiority of market systems over administrative 
108systems.” In addition, allowing markets to solve
societal problems does not suggest that government should 
not assume a role. Indeed, such a market system is anything 
but free. Government is the institution which formulates 
the rules and regulations which govern the market place and 
oversees that needs are, in fact, being met.
However, the authors do not suggest that market 
mechanisms always work. As Osborne and Gaebler note, "Many
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collective goods provided by government, from parks to 
public safety, are not traded in markets. Indeed, it is 
government that is called in when the market system has 
failed as was witnessed during the Progressive and New Deal 
Eras. Yet, despite failures, market mechanisms have 
advantages over administrative mechanisms such as the 
following: markets are decentralized, they are competitive,
they empower customers to make choices, and they link 
resources directly to results. In addition, markets respond 
quickly to rapid change and allow government to achieve the 
scale necessary to solve serious problems.
Government has often been synonymous with "program." 
Programs, as developed through the administrative process, 
have many flaws. Programs are driven by constituencies, not 
customers. Programs are driven by politics, not policy. 
Programs create "turf," which public agencies then defend at 
all costs. Programs tend to create fragmented service 
delivery systems. Programs are not self-correcting.
Programs rarely die. Programs rarely achieve the scale 
necessary to make a significant impact. And, finally, 
programs normally use commands, not incentives.
The market-based regulatory policy is first and formost 
centered around incentives rather than commands. A 
successful example of this theory is most helpful.
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In Washington, the Clean Air Act of 1990 stimulated 
interest in market-based strategies, because it 
included an emissions trading programs to control acid 
rain. Emissions trading is a market mechanism that 
acts like a green tax: polluters can pat to pollute or
innovate to save money. The EPA first tried it during 
the 1970s. It gave credits to firms that reduced air 
pollution below the level set by law, and allowed them 
to trade the credits between different sources of 
pollution within the firm or sell them to firms in the 
same general location. The idea was to encourage 
businesses to meet EPA's goals, but to let them figure 
out the most innovative and economical way to do so. 
if they could reduce one source of pollution 
economically, they could use the credits generated to 
offset others that were more expensive. This 
stimulated only a limited market in emissions trading, 
but is still estimated to have saved business between
$5 billion and $12 billion.^̂  ̂
Thus, when incentives are offered, a market-oriented 
government will encourage innovation and save money for both 
government and business.
The reinventing government concept precludes evolution. 
It assumes that the basic system is broken beyond repair.
The authors believe that a "new vision of government" must 
be shaped and pursued. Their purpose for writing
Reinventing Government was to offer the readers such a 
vision. Government is facing increasing trouble. And, the 
lack of a vision— "a new paradigm"— has crippled the system.
Osborne and Gaebler make many parallels to the earlier 
classic written by Peters and Waterman in 1982, In Search of 
Excellence: Lessons From America's Best-run Companies.
While Peters and Waterman focused on success stories in
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business, Osborne and Gaebler have searched widely among 
state and local governments in the U.S. for examples to 
illustrate the successes of entrepreneurial government. The 
book is filled with success stories form local governments 
like Phoenix, East Harlem, Louisville, St. Paul, Orlando, 
Visalia and from state governments in Florida, Michigan, 
South Carolina, Washington, and others. The examples show 
that the entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well throughout 
the country and that creative public servants working along 
side of motivated citizens can reinvent government and 
convince the public that they can demand more performance 
from government without asking for more resources. In fact, 
a major message of the book is that government can do more 
with less.
According to the authors, the Progressive movement of 
100 years ago used bureaucracy to achieve positive outcomes. 
Bureaucracy was seen as the most rational and efficient 
method of organization. The pioneers of this movement 
transformed government and minimized political patronage and 
political influence on the operations of government by 
creating among other thins civil service systems, 
independent public authorities, competitive bidding systems, 
and the profession of city managers to run the bureaucracy 
in an efficient, businesslike manner. As they indicate in 
the book, the legacy of the Progressives was that their
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reforms made if difficult to steal the public's money. 
However, the authors argue that these solutions, while 
solving one set of problems, have now created another set of 
problems.
All of the safeguards adopted by government have now 
made it virtually impossible to manage the public's money. 
Today, the citizen no longer sees government and its 
instrument, the bureaucracy, as a positive force. There is 
a crisis in government and citizens are losing confidence 
and trust in government at all levels. Today the 
predominant image of bureaucracy and government is that it 
is slow, inefficient, and impersonal. Few would disagree 
with the authors that confidence and trust in government has 
fallen to record lows in recent years. The second main 
message in the book is that our society now desperately 
needs a new vision of government— a new paradigm— that will 
replace the one developed by the Progressives. As the 
academic community would say, the authors want a paradigm 
shift.
An interesting question emerges from the numerous 
illustrations of successful entrepreneurial government used 
throughout the book: Why have some governments been able to
adopt the entrepreneurial spirit and strategies more readily 
than others? Factors, such as leadership, the political 
pressure received from the citizens to change, the wealth
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and other resources in the community that are needed in 
order to make things work, and particularly the critical 
mass of corporations and businesses that are needed for 
government to be able to experiment and use various co­
ventures. It may simply be easier to be successful in a 
middle/upper class community like Visalia, California, than 
in East St. Louis, 'Illinois. It may be that one must look 
at both failures and successes in order to understand the 
broader question of why some governments have more of a 
capacity to be entrepreneurial than others.
Osborne and Gaebler have essentially expressed the view 
that bureaucracy is broken beyond repair. In order to 
assess their solution of a total reinvention of bureaucracy 
based on an entrepreneurial model, it is important to look 
at how Osborne and Gaebler's model has been implemented in 
society. From there, conclusions of its apparent success or 
failure can be drawn. The following chapter offers such an 
analysis. The focus will be on administrative discretion 
and privatization, with a specific look at how the 
entrepreneurial model has effected nursing homes and child 
care. A  special look at how privatization has been utilized 
by past administrations will be offered as well.
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Bureaucracy is often seen as the core of modern 
problems. One solution is to replace bureaucratic power 
with market mechanisms. This process inevitably involves 
controversial practises such as deregulation and 
privatization. As Gaebler and Osborne proposed in their 
book, reinvention mechanisms include transferring more 
public responsibilities to the private sector, contracting 
out more of the functions that remain in public hands, 
increasing competition among public providers of services, 
and encouraging public managers to behave more 
entrepreneurially by increasing the incentives for good 
performance. According to most modern proponents of 
bureaucratic reform, the key to the above changes is that 
marketlike competition produces better results than 
government monopoly power. In other words, if the 
government is to have responsibility for a job, it ought to 
be subject to competitive pressures.
Bureaucratic reform movements have sprung from the 
inadequacies of the Progressive design. Most theories have 
emphasized the importance of four interrelated phenomena: 
the risk that the exercise of bureaucratic discretion and 
power will distort the public interest, the efforts of
69
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elected officials to seek to control this power, related 
efforts within the bureaucracy to direct administrative 
discretion, and the problems of balancing these controls 
with workers’ need for motivation.
Discussions of how concerned citizens might hold 
bureaucrats and their agencies accountable often contain an 
implicit assumption that more accountability and control are 
needed in order to keep these officials "in line"— that 
their natural tendency is to "go astray" unless closely 
w a t c h e d - T h e r e  is no question, of course, that in our 
system of checks and balances, every government entity must 
ultimately be held to account. In recent decades, however, 
that principle seems to have acquired an additional 
dimension that is not necessarily accurate. Many people 
seem to assume that administrative discretion can only be 
abused, at the expense of the public interest, and can serve 
no useful or constructive purpose. Many also complain that 
neither Congress nor the president are able or willing to 
control administrative actions fully or effectively. This 
point of view seems to suggest that elected officials can 
act only beneficially, while administrators can be expected 
to act only in a narrowly focused, inefficient, destructive, 
and otherwise irresponsible f a s h i o n . Y e t  there is reason 
to wonder if this view of discretion is valid.
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Administrative discretion was an important element in 
the thinking and writing of administrative reformers of a 
century ago. Woodrow Wilson, one of the foremost reformers, 
argued in his classic essay "The Study of Administration" 
(1887) that administrators should be granted "large powers 
and unhampered discretion"— both "administrative energy and 
administrative discretion"— as essential elements of their 
functioning in accordance with the notion of "political" 
neutrality. His expectation was that given the opportunity, 
administrators would exercise competent professional 
judgment as they carried out their assigned duties. This 
would serve the public interest (because sound public policy 
would result) and, in turn, the interests of elected 
officials of either political party (who could then take 
credit for effective governance). In sum, he saw discretion 
as necessary for administrative effectiveness as well as 
political neutrality.
One of the most prevalent concerns over bureaucratic 
discretion is related to the "iron triangle" model. Public- 
private connections have caused intense concern because the 
opportunities for and the effects of administrative 
indiscretion by public officials are, today, far better 
understood. Administrative discretion is the base for real 
administrative power that is hard to control. The large 
funds of private interests, the number of congressional
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subcommittees, and the intricacy of policy decisions all 
make it much easier for policymaking to become dominated by 
a handful of players.
The iron triangle model raises serious question about
relying on the private sector to reform public processes.
Private competition may provide more incentives for
efficiency than public monopoly, but it also increases the
danger that private interests will dominate the public
1T 7policy p r o c e s s . T h e  danger of capture of the public 
interest by private money is well understood. So too are 
the virtues of private competition. Far less well 
understood is how these two ideas collide: how using
private competition can increase the odds that private, not 
public, interests will dominate bureaucrat's decisions.
The Progressives assumed that the civil service reforms 
of the Pendleton Act would ensure accountability in the
1 1 opublic service. These values laid the foundation for
staffing government with experts and improving its 
efficiency. It has turned out, however, not to be so easy 
to ensure rectitude and accountability in our public 
agencies.
Relationships between public and private sectors that 
become too cozy obviously threaten the integrity of the 
administrative process. Because the iron triangle structure 
creates a natural context for forbidden deal making, a vast
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network of regulations now controls the behavior of 
government officials and the private sector representatives 
with whom they come into frequent contact. These rules do 
promote rectitude and accountability, but they do so by 
compromising morale and efficiency.^
Administrative discretion has one very positive aspect: 
program managers are frequently better prepared than 
legislators to make decisions on the basis of the broader 
public interest— and most administrators do so, most of the 
time. Interference with administrative discretion by 
congressional restraints and controls actually brings about 
the kind of narrow responsiveness to private interests which 
such controls seem designed to prevent. There are two 
reasons for this. First, very often "interest groups usurp
1 TfJpublic power through congressional committees," 
exercising considerable influence through both subsystems 
and issue networks. Second, as noted previously, 
legislators are strongly inclined to look after their own 
policy priorities and constituency interest; in the process 
of doing so, they pressure administrators to conform to 
their wishes. Thus, it is possible that if oversight of 
administration is left to legislators acting primarily in 
their committee roles, the actions taken by administrators 
may be more narrowly conceived and implemented than would be
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the case if those same administrators were given more 
freedom.
This is not a call for the complete autonomy of 
administrators. There is ample reason to be as concerned 
about abuses of power, or fraud, or corruption among public 
administrators as among any other government officials. 
However, a need has arisen to place greater implicit faith 
in administrators than is currently granted to them, if the 
public truly wants them to be able to act responsibly.
Under these circumstances, it would still be possible to 
hold them ultimately accountable, consistent with the scheme 
of government and with public expectations for 
accountability— and at least as effectively as is done at 
the present time.
The "Solution" of Privatization
While Gaebler and Osborne did not advocate a move 
towards wholesale privatization, their model does call for 
increased privatization. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the privatization concept and its ramifications. 
First, privatization encompasses an extraordinary range of 
activities involving the delivery of physical services, the 
delivery of social services, and even regulatory 
enforcement. When deciding whether to privatize, how to
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privatize, and with whom to privatize, policymakers should 
keep a number of criteria in mind.
Privatization is a tool of government. As Butler 
defines it, "Privatization is the shifting of a function, 
either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the 
private s e c t o r . P r i v a t i z a t i o n  is often justified as an 
effort to reduce the costs of government. In other 
instances, it seeks to reduce the size and scope of 
government. In other instances, it seeks to improve the 
performance and effectiveness of government.
Privatization is not a new phenomenon. Contracting 
out, for example, has occurred since the early days of the 
Republic. However, privatization attracted considerable 
interest and attention during the 1980s, thanks to strong 
support from the Reagan administration in the the United 
States and the Thatcher administration in the United 
Kingdom. During the 1990s, it has reemerged as an important 
issue in the United States as various governments seek to 
"reinvent" themselves and after the Republican Party 
regained control of both houses of Congress.
The current approach to privatization is largely 
pragmatic. Instead of treating privatization in 
ideological terms, the focus is on the when, how, and to 
whom of privatization. In addition, privatization is
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treated as an alternative to particular situations, and not 
a cure all for bureaucratic problems.
Privatization is a multifaceted phenomenon. It 
includes activities as routine as a local government's 
decision to contract out food or computer services provided 
in city hall and activities as momentous as a proposal that 
the federal government sell Amtrak or the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. It includes activities as innocuous as a 
decision to allow food stamp recipients to purchase food at 
the grocery store of their choice; activities as 
controversial as a proposal to permit parents to send a 
child to the private school of their choice.
During the 1970s, new political leadership looked to 
the private sector for ideas, advice, and helping hand in 
implementing new approaches to management in government.
For example. President Reagan, in his administration, 
highlighted the role the private sector would be asked to 
play. Indeed, the featured private-sector-led initiatives 
in eighty-four speeches, public appearances, or similar 
events during his first twenty-two months in office, an 
average of about once a week.
The conservative ideology has close ties to the 
business community, which believes that when a firm becomes 
"fat" it tends to make poor decisions, waste resources, and 
drift toward uncompetitiveness until bankruptcy results. To
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stop the drift, competent managers must be brought in to cut 
costs, eliminate waste, cut out unprofitable product lines, 
and return the firm to a competitive footing. This process 
is labeled "turnaround management." Thatcher and Reagan 
were convinced that the bureaucracies they invigorated had 
become "fat," and both leaders turned, albeit to varying 
degrees, to senior business executives to introduce 
turnaround management to government operations.
Co-opting the private sector as an ally had the added 
benefit of lessening the chance of being captured by the 
bureaucracy. This was particularly important for the new 
political agenda called for deprivledging the public service 
and for more decisions to be taken by the market. The goals 
of the new political leadership were obviously threatening 
to public servants. Dead aim had been taken at their jobs, 
their benefits, and the programs they presumably believed 
in. To be sure, undoing the Keynesian consensus meant there 
were fewer opportunities for advancement and less 
interesting work for public servants to fine tune the 
economy and the bureaucracy.
Thatcher and Reagan believed in the private sector 
perspective. This view advocated the means of management 
and intervention used in the private sector are superior to 
those of the public sector, and that whenever possible the
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public sector should either emulate the private sector or 
simply privatize the function.
One of the largest questions concerning privatization 
in the reform movements of the 1990s is over whom to 
contract out to. Government officials must decide whether 
to contract out to a for-profit firm or a nonprofit 
organization. They must choose between the second and third 
sectors, as they are sometimes called.
In Reinventing Government. Osborne and Gaebler argue 
persuasively that different sectors are better suited for 
different tasks. They then proceed to specify the tasks at 
which the private (for-profit) sector excels:
When tasks are economic in nature or when they require 
an investment orientation, the private (for-profit) 
sector is far more effective than either the public or 
third sector. It is also far better at replicating 
successful experiments, because the profit motive 
attracts investors and drives private companies to
imitate their successful competitors.
In contrast, the nonprofit sector excels at tasks that: 
generate little or no profit margin; require compassion and 
commitment to other humans; require a comprehensive, 
holistic approach; require extensive trust on the part of 
customers or clients; require volunteer labor; and require 
hands-on, personal attention such as day care, counseling,
1 goand services to the handicapped or ill.‘̂ "
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At first glance, the above criteria seem eminently 
reasonable. Where efficiency is the sole or primary goal, 
they imply a strong role for the non-profit sector. Where 
other considerations are paramount (equity, sensitivity, 
responsiveness), they imply a strong role for the nonprofit 
sector. Yet, if Osborne and Gaebler are correct, numerous 
government officials in the U.S. have made some very bad 
contracting decisions over the years.
Many social services that call for compassion, 
trustworthiness, and the ability to reach diverse 
populations are routinely provided by for-profit firms. A 
closer look at the social services sector reveals a very 
high profile for the for-profit sector in at least two 
areas: child care and residential care. Furthermore, the
role of the for-profit sector appears to be growing in 
several important areas. During the 1980s, the role of the 
for-profit sector increased more rapidly than that of the 
government or the nonprofit sector in hospital care, 
outpatient clinic and home health care, social services, and
1 9 Qhigher education. The role of the for-profit sector in
nursing home care slipped, but for-profit firms remain the 
leaders in this field.
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Privatization Case Study: Nursing Homes & Child Care
Should we be concerned about the growth of the for-
profit sector in these areas? That depends in part on
whether Osborne and Gaebler's generalizations are true. Is
the for-profit sector so obsessed with "the bottom line"
that quality suffers? Does the for-profit sector
demonstrate less caring behavior that the non-profit sector?
Does the for-profit sector have difficulty dealing with
diverse populations?
In two areas— nursing home care and child care--it is
possible to begin to answer these questions. According to
Weisbrod, nonprofit nursing homes perform better than for-
1 ̂0profit h o m e s . R e l a t i v e s  of patients at the nonprofit 
homes were more satisfied with the buildings and grounds, 
treatment, services, relations with staff, and social 
activities. In addition, nonprofit homes were far less 
likely to administer sedatives to patients— a practise that 
could be construed as a cost-cutting device. According to a 
variety of measures, the performance of nonprofit facilities 
for the care of the mentally handicapped was also superior. 
The findings on facilities for psychiatric care were mixed.
The evidence on child care is even more compelling. A 
nationwide survey of 2,089 group day care centers, conducted 
in 1990, reveals significant differences between for-profit
1 "Î1and non-profit providers. At for-profit centers, the
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teachers receive lower wages and turnover is higher. At
for-profit centers, child/staff ratios are higher and staff
credentials are less impressive. For-profit centers are
also less likely to care for disadvantaged children. This
is not surprising, since for-profit providers have been
1reluctant to locate in low-income neighborhoods.
This seems to confirm the suspicions voiced by Osborne 
and Gaebler. It also suggests the need to reverse course 
and reduce the role played by for-profit firms in providing 
health care, child care, and similar services. The 
differences between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors may 
reflect different priorities and goals. But they may also 
reflect different levels of external support. Also, in 
certain industries, such as child care, there is a need for 
all the responsible providers that can be gotten.
It is also important to stress that nonprofit 
organizations are not equally virtuous. In particular, 
religious organizations seem quite distinctive.
Interestingly enough, their distinctiveness has different 
implications in different areas. In his study of nursing 
homes, Weisbrod found that religious nonprofits applied an 
extra measure of devotion to caring and healing tasks.
In contrast, religious day care centers may be weaker in 
some respects than other day care centers. For example, 
religious day care centers are less likely than other
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nonprofits to care for disadvantaged children. Indeed, 
religious day care centers are somewhat less likely than 
for-profit firms to care for disadvantaged children.
Overall, it may well be that the nonprofit sector has 
advantages over the for-profit sector in delivering health, 
education, and welfare services. The nonprofit sector may 
be somewhat more likely to experiment and to offer diverse 
s e r v i c e s . T h e  nonprofit sector may be somewhat more 
willing to assist the needy and to serve diverse 
populations. Clearly, however, these and other hypotheses 
must be further tested before dismissing for-profit firms as 
ill-suited to these policy areas.
Summary
In thinking about privatization, it is customary to 
begin and sometimes end with the goal of efficiency. 
Undoubtedly, efficiency is needed both inside and outside 
government. But it is impossible to discuss privatization 
fairly without considering other important goals as well. 
Effectiveness, equity, accountability, legitimacy, quality, 
reliability, empowerment, and choice are among the other 
goals that need to be considered.
In looking to the private sector for inspiration, 
Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s had ideologies that 
differed radically from that which gave rise to traditional
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thinking on public administration. The private sector works 
from the bottom up, with the hidden hand of the market 
providing the key s i g n a l s . B u s i n e s s  firms employ the 
most advanced management practices to interpret these 
signals and marshal their resources as efficiently as 
possible to provide a solid base for competing in the 
marketplace. To be sure, a corporation’s senior management 
will lay down the broad corporate strategy to which everyone 
down the line must rally, but once the strategy is defined, 
managers are often free to improvise and to make decisions 
on the spot, so long as their operations turn a profit. 
Objectives are easily understood, and senior executives see 
no reason why they should not delegate authority, as long as 
the objectives are being met. Since the objectives are 
straightforward, it is also easy to check on the results.
The public sector works from the top down. According
to Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy, those at the
top make the decisions, which the lower ranks implement,
following carefully prescribed rules and regulations. The
word management scarcely appeared in government operations
until the 1950s and 1960s with the advent of the Hoover
commissions. When it did appear, it was often to signal
"management direction," designed to tie "staff closely into
117a closely organized set of tasks. The term
administration, rather than management, best described
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government operations; administrators rather than managers 
were in charge. The role of administrator involved the 
applying of formalized procedures and somehow reconciling 
the separate priorities of politics and administration. It 
is important to recognize that the concept of administration 
in government acquired its definition when much of the 
government's work was routine and predictable. When the 
scope of government activities expanded into various areas, 
including the provision of goods and services, some people 
began to question whether traditional administration, with 
its rule-bound organizations and behavior, was still 
appropriate to the requirements of the modern state. Such 
questions were raised by Hoover, Glassco, and Fulton, but in 
the end these commissions had limited impact on government 
operations or did not change them in the direction hoped.
As with the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, there 
is a current push for management discipline in government 
operations. Again like the previously mentioned 
administrations, the solution is partly rooted in reducing 
government bureaucracy by contacting out activities to the 
private sector and by introducing a new management culture 
for the bureaucrats who remain. Nevil Johnson explains that 
the notion of introducing a management culture to government 
is derived from commercial operations. It has ideological 
overtones, emphasizes the effective use of resources of all
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kinds, is seen as dynamic, and constitutes a remedy for the 
defects of administration. Christopher Pollitt is more 
blunt. He argues simply that "managerialism needs to be 
understood as an ideology.
To introduce a new management culture to government 
operations, notwithstanding its strong ideological 
underpinning, is no small task. Taken at face value, the 
reinventing government rhetoric sets the bureaucracy against 
itself. It signals a new mind set, a new vocabulary, and a 
proliferation of management techniques and procedures to 
force government operations to become more frugal and more 
efficient, and it requires public servants willing to make 
tough management decisions.
Changing the vocabulary is the easy part. Changing a 
mind set anchored in years of transition and in a firmly 
entrenched bureaucratic culture is another matter. The 
following chapter discusses the downfalls of a radical 
reinvention movement such as Osborne and Gaebler's. In 
addition, it suggests that modern trends incorporating 
entrepreneurial paradigms actually set the precedence for 
reform under the current system, rather than encouraging a 
complete overhaul of government bureaucracy.
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V. PUBLIC MANAGMENT REFORM: IS IT NECESSARY?
The Mood of Reform
Public innovation has been sweeping public institutions 
across America. Innovations in property acquisition and 
leasing, responding to community challenges to waste 
disposal plans, reducing paperwork burdens, and lowering the 
costs of computer maintenance contacts are just a few 
examples of such innovations. Competitive awards 
celebrating innovative excellence in state and local 
governments have not lacked for nominations, and university 
programs devoted to improving government productivity have 
been busy providing support to officials requesting help 
with new projects.
For American public administration, in short, necessity 
has become the spur of change and innovation. Stirred to 
action by budget cuts attributable to tax revolts and 
economic downturns, government administrators have responded 
with creative solutions that challenge the stereotypical 
image of the recalcitrant bureaucrat. Administrators have 
begun breaking free of the constraints that have 
characterized their jobs. Insofar as they have loosened 
those constraints, they have engaged in deregulating 
government. In doing so, they have forged ahead of 
political leaders, academics, and the "good government"
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reformers who have traditionally led the charge for changes 
in public administration.
Recently, the nation has witnessed the conversion of
this ad hoc process into a consolidated reform movement, a
version of the so-called management revolution that spread
11Qthroughout corporate America in the 1980s. That
revolution also began when managers broke through well- 
established organizational constraints and market barriers. 
It first came to the public's attention through Peters and 
Waterman's In Search of Excellence, a study built on 
observations of what successful companies were doing that 
made them stand out during a business decline. Even the 
jargon of the private sector movement, from total quality 
management and entrepreneurialism to liberation management 
and learning organizations, has become common wherever 
public officials meet to discuss reforming government.
The similarities do not end there, for just as a 
private sector revolution has generated a variety of 
managerial reforms, deregulating government is but one 
reform to emerge in response to what is taking place in the 
public sector. In what ways does this impulse resemble 
other reform efforts that have gained support in recent 
years? What are the prospects for significant and 
sustainable change under deregulation of its alternatives?
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Change in government has been promoted by rekindled 
public interest in administrative r e f o r m . T h e  increase 
in innovative government actions has been one product of 
this renewed focus. Another has been the development of 
relevant administrative theories that— separately or 
together--might provide an intellectual framework for 
reform.
The conditions that launched the innovative actions in 
the United States and abroad--economic recession and 
stagflation, tight energy resources, awareness of 
environmental degradation, the failure of domestic social 
and economic policies— also stimulated rethinking about what 
government is and how it should work. Among the products 
of that rethinking was the concept of "reinventing 
government." This concept has received considerable 
attention in the news media and has attracted a following 
among public sector professionals and politicians.
Reinventing government lacks the academic underpinning 
of other theories. Although they draw rationalizations from 
the advocates of minimal statism and deregulating 
government, the reinventors take their true inspiration from 
the experience of practitioners. From such a composite of 
theory and practice, Osborne and Gaebler coauthored 
Reinventing Government. The popularity of this book was one 
of the most visible signs that this movement was widespread
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and had gained momentum. Given its dozens of case studies 
drawn from state and local government, the book found a 
receptive audience among administrators at those levels. As 
Jonathan Walters reports, "lots of state and local officials 
are getting plenty done, and reinvention by whatever name is 
going on all over the country."^^2
Ideas posited by Osborne and Gaebler had the 
enthusiastic endorsement of Bill Clinton, and many appeared 
as major planks in his 1992 presidential platform. Clinton 
followed through on those platform promises by creating a 
National Performance Review task force headed by Vice 
President A1 Gore. The theme of "reinventing" was 
preeminent in the work of the task force, and when the 
group’s 168-page formal report was unveiled on September 7, 
1993, the inside-the-beltway media attributed principal 
authorship to "reinventing government guru and government 
consultant David Osborne .
The National Performance Review, sometimes called the 
"reinventing government initiative," takes much of its 
agenda, as well as its informal title, from Osborne and 
Gaebler. Vice-President Gore outlined the goals of the 
review at a press conference on April 15, 1993: evaluate
the efficiency of every federal agency, identify and 
eliminate waste and inefficiency throughout the federal 
service, streamline the federal personnel system, and change
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the culture of federal bureaucracy and empower workers.
Some 200 federal employees have become the eyes, ears, 
hands, and feet of the National Performance Review. They 
are organized into various reinvention teams. Together they 
are to gather detailed data and fashion prescriptive 
analyses on the performance of all federal agencies, 
addressing themselves in particular to the efficacy of 
various leadership strategies and management structures.
And they were to do all this by Labor Day 1993, at which 
time the Vice President had promised to unveil the Clinton 
administration's blueprint for a reinvented government.
The effort rested on broad public opinion that it is 
indeed past time to rethink the balance of public and 
private sector responsibilities. It is time to rearrange 
the organization of the federal bureaucracy in a way that 
will shorten internal lines of communication and promote 
coordination across functional and jurisdictional 
boundaries. In other words, it was time to decentralize 
government so as "to facilitate entrepreneurial activity by 
civil servants and ultimately change the culture of public 
bureaucracy.
The results of the 1992 presidential election 
emphasized the American public's expectation of constructive 
change. And even a cursory examination of federal 
management practises demonstrates why this expectation rises
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to the level of a demand. No one, however, should 
underestimate how hard it will be to change patterns of 
bureaucratic operation, organization forms, and structural 
constraints that have evolved over the course of a century. 
Short-term confidence and enthusiasm are obvious 
requirements. As one bureaucratic academian, John J.
Dilulio notes, "The competence and dedication of federal 
administrators working without fanfare and often without 
thanks is representative of even higher v a l u e s . I t  must 
not be forgotten that the federal government as it functions 
today cannot be reinvented because "it was not invented in 
the first place. The Bureaucracy evolved through pragmatic, 
almost catch-as catch-can responses to particular problems 
as they appeared. It is this development that warns of
the need for an incremental, evolutionary, experimental 
approach to institutional reforms.
Is Public Management Adapting Without Drastic Change?
The advocates of reinventing show no reluctance 
introducing the virtues of greater reliance on government, 
once it is reconfigured into reinvented forms. As more 
traditionalist theorists, the reinventors suggest that 
reform be accomplished by example and through political 
means- Their orientation provides the rationale for 
energizing a politically effective movement. To focus that
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energy, they call for revolutionizing how the nation thinks 
about government and the way things get done. Innovative 
actions of public officials represent "nothing less than a 
shift in the basic model of governance in America."
This shift is under way all around us, but because we 
are not looking for it— because we assume that all 
governments have to be big, centralized, and 
bureaucratic— we seldom see it. We are blind to the 
new realities because they do not fit our 
preconceptions...What we need most if this revolution 
is to succeed...is a new frame work for understanding
government, a new way of thinking about government. 
Thus, what the reinventing government approach lacks in 
theoretical originality is made up for with a firm belief in 
the ability to institute comprehensive improvements through 
rethinking government and taking advantage of a political
situation in which all the conditions for reform are
149present.^
A theme common to current reform movements is the urge 
to debureaucratize government administration.
Debureaucratization is an idea neither new nor restricted to 
critics of American government. Frustration among political 
leaders and others at what they perceive as the more 
pernicious effects of big government has been endemic 
worldwide for decades. In the British Commonwealth, 
administrative reforms such as the new public management 
have emerged in New Zealand, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom. Scandinavian nations have embarked on programs to
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renew their national administrative systems, and even the 
highly centralized French government adopted a plan that 
would endow the providances with greater importance.
In addition, innovative public programs that have 
broken free of the constraints of bureaucratic procedures 
have been common. "America is constantly inventing itself," 
observed Bruce Smith a decade ago, "and the capacity to 
invent new ways of accomplishing the public's business has 
been a great strength. The working technology of public 
action greatly expanded between the 1930s and 1960s. 
Government contracting and other strategies were adopted at 
all levels of American government. The responses to the 
challenges of the times received little attention, but they 
established a practical legacy for the debureaucratization 
movement.
Classical Bureaucracy Resists Drastic Change
If the diverse debureaucratization approaches coalesce 
to form an effective political movement, it will not be the 
first time. The movement that created the administrative 
structure so vehemently challenged by the debureaucratizing 
coalition was itself the product of a coalition that 
developed after the Civil War when middle-class reformers 
sought to end political corruption and adopt more 
businesslike approaches to government administration. By
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the early 1900s the coalition had found common ground with 
both the Progressive movement and the scientific management 
school. The resulting archetype for government, regarded 
at the time as a significant improvement, is now itself the 
target of reform common to the reinventing focus.
Unlike earlier reform movements, in which the focus was 
the corruption of public officials and the inefficiencies of 
government, the advocates of debureaucratization are focused 
on the logic that has defined the work of the public sector 
and public administration for nearly half a century.
Each takes aim at the bureaucratized public sector.
Although few would question the significant role played by 
the bureaucratized public sector in the development of the 
modern state, it has rarely lacked for critics. 
Bureaucratization is credited by both friends and foes with 
having redesigned the social world. Thus when approaching 
the problems of bureaucratization, the new reformers address 
problems that go beyond the hierarchical forms of public 
organizations or the creation of bureaucratic personalities. 
Too much attention to structures, they contend, leads to 
mere tinkering rather than substantial change, and attacking 
the behavior of bureaucrats is akin to blaming the 
v i c t i m . I n s t e a d ,  they focus on the way bureaucratization 
distorts government and the way it operates.
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Bureaucratization can accomplish three closely related 
tasks. It can reduce uncertainty, it can impose order, and, 
through appropriate designs, it can constrain and guide the 
very power its orderliness unleashes. These are desirable 
functions, but each also generates a challenge to effective 
governance. Reducing uncertainty means minimizing 
disruptive forces from outside (competition, for example) 
and from within the organization (as with innovativeness). 
Orderliness, brought about primarily through hierarchical 
structures, has similar stifling consequences and can 
separate an organization from reality. These negative 
results have often been reinforced through restrictions that 
were mostly designed with other dangers in mind.
Redressing these results demands rethinking 
bureaucratic logic. For many of the new reformers, 
debureaucratizing requires transformation of ideas, a 
revolution that changes the model of governance. Promoting 
debureaucratization through paradigmatic change is the focus 
of those who advocate reinventing government. They 
scrutinize beliefs "embedded in the bureaucratic paradigm," 
including the definitive delegation of hierarchical 
authority, the uniform application of rules and procedures, 
the reliance on experts to carry out both line and staff 
functions, a narrow definition of primary responsibilities, 
and the efficiency of having he centralized staff exercise
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"unilateral control over line agencies* administrative 
actions.
In the U.S., the work of Osborne and Gaebler and its 
emphasis on reinventing government informed the 1992 
presidential election. Despite the Clinton victory and the 
current administration's emphasis on government as a problem 
solver, clearly it will not be business as usual for the 
public service and its members. "Reinventing" means 
fundamental redesign of the system of government; the civil 
service system, with its years of accumulated rules and 
regulations, is a primary target.
Nevertheless, much of the prescriptive content of the 
reforms in the U.S. and elsewhere has not flowed from 
research or systematic analysis of public organizations. 
Rather, it has emerged from advocates of private sector 
change models or from the experience of a limited number of 
case studies, most of them focused on local government. 
Further, many of the proposed reforms advocate a role for 
the public service and its members that is in conflict with 
much of the history of public administration in the U.S. As 
a result, proposed reforms have posed significant 
theoretical issues, which have not been addressed in reform 
debates.
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The Need for Theory
With debureaucratization as a common theme, the
reinventors seem to have the potential to amass the
theoretical and strategic resources needed to launch a
1 4Rreform movement.^® Launching a movement and succeeding, 
however, are not the same. To succeed, they must do three 
things: offer a viable agenda for reform, which means they
must get their theory in order; establish the movement as a 
credible political force; and move cultural and 
institutional biases away from supporting the dominant 
bureaucratic paradigm.
The main objective for reinventors is to establish 
specific proposals if they are going to get beyond rhetoric. 
Therefore, the need to create an agenda to act on, one that 
can be explained to policy makers and the public and 
packaged as actions for legislators, executives, or managers 
is needed. To create such an agenda, the reinventors must 
develop a reasonably coherent theoretical structure for 
their alternative to the bureaucratic paradigm.
The reinventors offer little theoretical underpinning, 
relying on anecdotal evidence and theory borrowed from 
others. A sophisticated theory, however, does not 
necessarily translate into a viable agenda for reform.
Reform requires public understanding and support, and all 
too often it has been the more vacuous theories that have
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worked best before mass audiences. Furthermore, 
prescriptions engendered by a well-articulated theory might 
prove politically and technically infeasible.
The consequences of abandoning the effort to construct 
a theory and allowing the political agenda to proceed on its 
own was amply demonstrated by the steps taken early in the 
Clinton administration to launch its program for reforming 
government. Lacking a coherent theory, as presented by 
Osborne and Gaebler, the reinventors had not presented a 
useful agenda for President Clinton to act o n . As a 
result the administration's initial steps, under the banner 
of reinventing government, were a hodgepodge of initiatives, 
many of them based on questionable assumptions.^^®
Mhat Will It Take to Achieve Reform?
What does it take for an administrative reform movement 
to be taken seriously in the American political arena? 
Despite the constant concern with administrative reform in 
contemporary American politics, successful movements can be 
counted on one hand. If the measure of a successful reform 
is defined as the establishment of a new administrative 
culture, then success has occurred only twice since 1787, 
the institutionalization of the spoils system (1820s-80s) 
and its replacement by the bureaucratic paradigm associated 
with the Progressive Era. The two cases differ in
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indications of what constitutes credible politics for 
promoting a reform movement. The first was tied to a 
partisan political program; the second evolved over several 
decades, relying on a variety of organizational and 
political strategies.
A  crucial factor in a mobilization effort is 
leadership, and several roles can emerge during a movement. 
Leaders in developing the beliefs upon which the movement is 
based are important, as are those who mobilize members. To 
the extent that the movement has an organized component, it 
will need organizational leaders who will be concerned with 
the stability, growth, and tactics of the group. Political 
leaders will also arise within the movement to represent 
factions that might have strategical or ideological 
differences with other factions. Even prestige seekers, 
leaders engaged in maintaining the prestige of the 
organization or movement in the public eye," are needed.
As a political force, debureaucratization has not 
developed so far as to need a formal organization, although 
it has from time to time and place to place been associated 
with other organizations (for example the reinventors' links 
with the Democratic party under Clinton). There are leaders 
who can be labeled formulators, but their contribution has 
been limited to writing books and articles, giving speeches, 
and providing advice, formally or informally, to
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policymakers. What is missing is a mobilizing leader, 
someone who can bring the diverse elements of the movement 
together into some organizational form. For now, these 
leaders have met with limited success.
The problem faced by potential mobilizing leaders is 
that administrative reform does not have the appeal of other 
issues. This was brought out most clearly by what Clinton 
campaign officials called the "Speech He Never Gave” :
It was the one on 'reinventing government' or 
'entrepreneurial government,' or the 'New Paradigm,' 
depending on the buzz phrase you choose to describe the 
theory... It 's not that Clinton wasn't itching to talk 
about the subject...What held Clinton back was the fear 
of putting audiences to sleep with an arcane discussion 
of applying the ideas of management gurus... to federal 
institutions. So he kept his discussions about the
specifics of reinventing government private.
Without a mobilizing leader or some other force to get the 
agenda in front of the public, the debureaucratizing 
movement will remain in the "incipient phase" of its 
development. With effective leadership it would achieve 
"enthusiastic mobilization," which would then be followed by 
a "period of institutionalization and organization.
As the example of the Progressive reformers 
demonstrates, however, although mobilizing leaders like 
Theodore Roosevelt or Robert LaFollette are needed, a 
credible movement can still develop without a unified 
organizational base. For the Progressives there were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
various jurisdictions (local, state, and national) and 
institutional contexts (electoral systems, legislature, 
executive branch, and even judiciary) through which to 
affect reform. As Neil Smelser observes, "the history of 
any given movement— its ebbs and flows, its switches, its 
bursts of enthusiasm— can be written in large part as a 
pattern of abandoning one method which appears to be losing 
effectiveness and adopting some new, more promising 
method-
Still, the political success of debureaucratization 
will depend heavily on the development of mobilizing 
leadership- This can be a role President Clinton or even a 
leader of the partisan opposition such as Jack Kemp might 
play. But tying the reform agenda to either party does not 
bode well for long-term success. It would be more fruitful 
if the leadership of both parties supported the movement, a 
cooperation that worked well for the Progressive reformers. 
Short of that, the support of the party in power will have 
to suffice.
A viable agenda and political clout are necessary, but 
little reform will be achieved in the long run without 
addressing the dominance of the bureaucratic paradigm.
There are other obstacles to be overcome, but the 
bureaucratic orthodoxy must be dethroned: "if the dogma
survives any successful innovative arrangements will be
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regarded as but exceptions to good practice. " Indeed, 
the bureaucratic model may be stronger than the intellectual 
and political power or the reinventors. It has intellectual 
roots that link it with the academic study of public 
administration, it has the ability to generate solutions to 
administrative problems that are feasible and workable, and 
it is compatible with the political culture and 
institutional context of contemporary government.
Part of the problem facing reformers is that the 
emergence of public administration as a field of study was 
closely linked to the efforts of Progressive reformers to 
establish the bureaucratic paradigm as the dominant model of 
governance for the United States. Most histories trace the 
academic roots to Woodrow Wilson's 1887 essay, "The Study of 
Administration," which urged systematic investigation of the 
business side of government. The goal was to discover
principles that could be applied to promote efficient 
government operations. At the same time, Wilson implicitly 
outlined the bureaucratic paradigm. Besides the classic 
separation of administration from politics, a pervasive 
premise was his assumption that administration must be 
rooted in a centralized and unified authority. He also 
advocated creating "a corps of civil servants prepared by 
special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a
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perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and
characteristic discipline.
Although the wisdom of Wilson's doctrine can be
questioned, its intellectual impact cannot. The urge to
establish firm principles of public administration and the
widespread assumption that good administration had
bureaucratic characteristics created a close association
between paradigm and field.
Significant challenges to the classical approach to the
study of public administration emerged during the 1930s, and
by the 1950s a logical-positivist model was well on its way
1to replacing the scientific search for principles. 
Nevertheless, the bureaucratic paradigm had been set and has 
thrived as the conventional wisdom in public administration. 
Though scholars stress limitations, no substitute body of 
normative ideas on how to organize a bureaucracy has taken 
their place. Consequently, consultants and committees 
charged with recommending large governmental reorganizations
171still regularly fall back upon them.
Those who have studied public administration know that 
it takes more than reasoned criticism, an alternative 
theory, or a research program demonstrating the need for an 
alternative to overcome the orthodoxy. All those weapons 
have been used. The paradigm remains resilient in the face
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of evidence generated against it by the very science created 
by those associated with establishing it.
One reason for its strength is that the bureaucratic 
paradigm continues to be a source of solutions to 
administrative problems. Academics may point out logical 
fallacies and contradictions in the model, but government 
administrators are more interested in what works. "The 
decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic 
organization," observed Max Weber, "has always been its 
purely technical superiority over any other form of
1 *79organization."^'^ That superiority is found in the 
bureaucratic organization's ability to provide a stable and 
simplified environment for carrying out administrative 
tasks. The productive capacities of the organization comes 
from its ability to reshape or control difficult situations.
Those who challenge the orthodoxy acknowledge some 
continuing value of the bureaucratic approach but believe 
that value is severely limited in today's turbulent 
environment. Osborne and Gaebler, for example, speak of 
bureaucracies as creatures of the past that worked superbly,
in crisis, when goals were clear and widely shared, 
when tasks were relatively straightforward, and when 
virtually everyone was willing to pitch in for the 
cause... Bureaucratic institutions still work in some 
circumstances. If the environment is stable, the task 
is relatively simple, every customer wants the same 
service, and the quality of performance is not
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critical, a traditional public bureaucracy can do the 
job.
But those preconditions, the authors contend, now exist for 
only a few public agencies (social security and public 
libraries, for example). "Most government institutions 
perform increasingly complex tasks, in competitive, rapidly 
changing environments, with customers who want quality and 
choice."^
These statements reflect a lack of appreciation for the 
popularity of bureaucratic solutions among public sector 
managers and the power of bureaucratic organizations to 
reconfigure their working environments in order to achieve 
the appropriate kind of environmental stability and 
uniformity.
Despite Osborne and Gaebler's argument, the use of 
bureaucratic methods continues to be widespread and is not 
limited to stable environments and simple tasks. What is 
perceived as a movement away from bureaucratic forms is more 
likely a movement toward bureaucratic forms that are 
compatible with the shifting demands of the public sector. 
Many and varied public sector species have been produced
17<from the bureaucratic genus. While they are
unquestionably bureaucracies, government agencies are not 
the archetypal bureaucracies described by Max Weber. Many 
of these variations are the products of institutional 
contexts, others reflect the policies surrounding their
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establishment, and still others have been adaptations in the 
face of change. Thus what Osborne and Gaebler mistake
for the decline and growing irrelevance of bureaucracy is 
actually adaptation. The variants differ somewhat from the 
classical model, but they retain some of the primary 
characteristics that made bureaucratic methods such a potent 
force.
The bureaucratic paradigm continually demonstrates its
superiority over alternative approaches by doing more than
merely creating organizations that fit their environs; it
transforms itself and its environment to render challenging
situations more manageable. As an organizational
methodology, bureaucracies can transform difficult
conditions to more simple, placid states or can adapt their
own organizational forms to environmental features conducive
1 77to bureaucratic stability. Consider, for example,
redundant bureaucracies, two agencies or programs that 
perform the same function. Although contrary to some of the 
most fundamental principles of the bureaucratic paradigm, 
redundancy is widely accepted in practice and theory as a 
potential bureaucratic solution to some situations. When 
appropriately designed and applied, redundancy not only 
provides backup where service might be interrupted, but also 
may improve service delivery and reduce the risks of 
accidents.
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Max Weber understood the power and implications of 
bureaucracies’ transformational qualities: "Once fully
established, bureaucracy is among those social structures 
which are the hardest to destroy. The staying power of
bureaucratic solutions is manifest in their ability to adopt 
widely varying responses to a shifting environment— from 
responses that build solutions using current organizations 
and programs to those that develop innovative solutions,
1 7Qwithin the confines of the general bureaucratic paradigm.
The success of these adaptations may be the real story 
behind the cases cited by Osborne and Gaebler and others 
because the innovative and entrepreneurial actions taken by 
practitioners have often been fostered by the very same 
bureaucratic contest that seemed so impenetrable and 
intransigent. Thus while some might regard the examples 
Osborne and Gaebler use as demonstrating the possibility of 
a nonbureaucratic paradigm, others see in them a 
reaffirmation of the bureaucratic capacity to adapt.
Despite the potential drawbacks to relying on 
nonbureaucratic methods, bureaucracies remain the primary 
means for dealing with administrative tasks. Turbulent 
environments have certainly challenged the capacities of the 
bureaucratic paradigm, but there is no indication that it 
has failed as an adaptable way of dealing with most of the 
challenges facing government administrators.
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The impression that the bureaucratic paradigm is 
relevant to the challenges facing government administration 
is strengthened by its operationality and feasibility.
These awkward terms reject major criteria most practitioners 
apply to any suggestions for reform: can they be translated
into realistic programs both technically and financially?
In a 1992 meeting of public officials and academics
called to discuss the reinventing government agenda, a
recurring criticism of Osborne and Gaebler's book was that
it did not adequately describe "the process by which change
occurs, offering instead such obfuscatory terms as paradigm
shift and such seemingly oversimplified notions as steering, 
1 onnot rowing. It is one thing to talk about change,
another to do something about it. Although practitioners 
might welcome an alternative to the bureaucratic orthodoxy, 
they are unlikely to accept one that does not provide some 
practical suggestions.
Feasibility raises different but related concerns. 
Unless conditions are ripe, no reform program will be taken 
seriously, and a large number of conditions come into play. 
One study of common barriers to productivity improvement 
listed three dozen potential obstacles to public sector 
innovations - Some are rooted in general conditions and 
range from legal restrictions and political considerations 
to the short time horizons of the public and elected
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officials. Even more barriers can block organizational 
changes from within. And there are personal barriers, 
reflecting the fact that ultimately change must depend on 
the people who enact it. Considering all these potential 
obstructions, its seems a miracle that change occurs at all.
The bureaucratic paradigm has a considerable advantage 
over any competing paradigm, both operationally and 
feasibility. The fact that bureaucratic reforms can take 
place within existing bureaucratized contexts is the 
principal advantage. Incremental or complementary 
innovations are likely to be easier than the radical ones 
that would be required for a shift to nonbureaucratic 
methods. For example, Osborne and Gaebler would replace 
"administrative mechanisms" with a combination of market 
mechanisms and community empowerment. Markets would bring 
efficiency and effectiveness, while empowered communities 
would provide the "warmth and caring" that markets lack.
But while offering examples to emulate, Osborne and Gaebler 
fail to elaborate on the means for achieving them.
Ironically, the reforms that would bring about such 
innovations would require that government create the right 
conditions--changing market rules, sharing private sector 
risks, shifting public investment policies, and so forth.
In other words, government would have to engage in a radical 
transformation to create or improve market mechanisms and
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community groups while terminating administered programs and 
probably dislocating people currently served. Implementing 
changes within existing programs that would sharpen 
bureaucrats sensitivity to those they serve would seem more 
attractive. And there is no shortage of ideas for how to 
implement such changes. For all its problems, the 
bureaucratic paradigm remains compatible with America's 
institutional norms and the cultural values that undergird 
them.
As chapter one denotes, bureaucracy is an essential 
institution for everyone in society. Due to its importance, 
it is critical to understand the concepts which make up such 
an imposing and intricate institution. Chapter two 
discussed a selection of reforms of the bureaucratic model 
which have brought the model up to current times and 
conditions. Chapter three presented the basic tenets of the 
entrepreneurial model, while chapter four analyzed how just 
two of the entrepreneurial reforms have impacted societal 
programs. Finally, in chapter five, it was concluded that 
classic bureaucracy has shown an amazing resilience to 
remain functional in modern times. Despite its age, 
classical bureaucracy has been able to serve the public well 
due to modifications from previous reform movements. The 
evolutionary characteristic of bureaucracy suggests that 
reformers, such as Osborne and Gaebler, work towards a more
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lasting, incremental change to infuse innovation in classic 
public management. Bureaucracy was receptive to the brief 
and limited experimentations by the Clinton administration 
which sought to increase efficiency and effectiveness as 
delineated by Osborne and Gaebler's model. This 
receptiveness suggests that classical bureaucracy already 
has the ability to incorporate functional modifications 
without institutional reinvention.
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